TREATIES IN U.S. COURTS:
JUDGE BORK’S ANTI-ORIGINALIST REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Robert Bork is widely known as one of the leading modern exponents of
originalism.1 Many scholars would be surprised, therefore, to learn that Judge Bork
authored a very influential opinion when he was a judge on the D.C. Circuit that shifted
judicial doctrine in a direction that is directly contrary to the Founders’ original
understanding. The case was Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.2 The constitutional
issue relates generally to separation of powers, and specifically to the judiciary’s role in
treaty enforcement. Judge Bork made new law in Tel-Oren by creating a presumption
against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts. To overcome that presumption,
Bork said, individual litigants must show that the treaty creates a private right of action,
or that Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the treaty.3
Thus, under the “Bork model” of treaty enforcement, courts lack authority to provide
remedies for violations of individual treaty rights unless the treaty itself creates a private
right of action, or Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the
treaty in domestic courts.
The Bork model contrasts sharply with the “Marshall model” of treaty
enforcement, named for Chief Justice John Marshall. Under the Marshall model, if a
treaty is the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause, and the treaty protects
individual rights, then the judiciary has both the power and the duty to provide remedies
for violations of individual treaty rights, unless the treaty itself bars domestic judicial
remedies, or Congress has enacted legislation precluding judicial enforcement of the
treaty. Moreover, in cases where a court has jurisdiction, the court does not need express
authorization from the political branches – either in the form of a federal statutory right
of action, or in the form of an express private right of action in the treaty – to provide
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights, because it is the judiciary’s
responsibility within our system of divided government to supply the remedy for
violations of treaty-based individual rights.4
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See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

(1990).
2

726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) (“Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to
courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it
expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.”).
4
See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“Each
treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights. Whenever a
right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of
the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected.”); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the
rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by
the court as an act of congress.”)
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The conflict between the Bork model and the Marshall model is directly relevant
to two cases currently pending before the Supreme Court. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court granted cert. to decide whether Guantanamo detainees who have been designated
for trial by military commission can “obtain judicial enforcement from an Article III
court of rights protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention5 in an action for a writ of
habeas corpus challenging the legality of their detention by the Executive branch.”6 In
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Court granted cert. to decide whether Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,7 which protects the rights of foreign nationals
arrested in the United States,8 conveys “individual rights of consular notification and
access to a foreign detainee enforceable in the Courts of the United States.”9 Both the
D.C. Circuit in Hamdan and the Oregon Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas applied the
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties, and concluded on that basis
that the treaties at issue were not judicially enforceable in U.S. courts.10 If the Supreme
Court applies the Marshall model, though, it will undoubtedly decide that both treaties
are judicially enforceable. Thus, the outcome of both cases may hinge on whether the
Court applies the Marshall model or the Bork model.11
There are three reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Bork model.
First, the Marshall model is consistent with the Founders’ original understanding of the
judiciary’s role in the domestic enforcement of treaties. The Bork model, in contrast, is
at odds with the original understanding. Second, the Marshall model is consistent with
two hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Borkian presumption against
private enforcement of treaties, on the other hand, is a radical departure from a twocenturies-old tradition. Judge Bork invented that presumption in 1984; it has never been
endorsed by the Supreme Court. Third, application of the Bork model produces very
harmful consequences. When courts apply the Bork model, they perpetuate treaty
violations by state governments, they abdicate their constitutional responsibility to

5

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention].
6
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Docket Number 05-184, Questions Presented, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00184qp.pdf. Oral argument is set for March 28, 2006. For docket
information, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-184.htm.
7
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter VCCR].
8
See id., art. 36, para. 1.
9
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Docket Number 04-10566, Questions Presented, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-10566qp.pdf. Similarly, Bustillo v. Johnson, which the Supreme
Court consolidated with Sanchez-Llamas, presents the question whether “state courts may refuse to
consider violations of Article 36 . . . because the treaty does not create individually enforceable rights.”
Bustillo
v.
Johnson,
Docket
Number
05-51,
Questions
Presented,
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00051qp.pdf. Oral argument is set for both cases on March 29,
2006. For docket information, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-10566.htm.
10
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573
(Or. 2005). In Bustillo, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an unpublished order that affirmed the circuit
court opinion without providing any rationale.
11
In each case, it is possible for the Court to duck the question whether the treaty is judicially
enforceable, and thus sidestep the conflict between the Marshall model and the Bork model, by deciding
the case on other grounds.
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restrain illegal executive action, and they damage the United States’ international
reputation.12
*****
This article builds upon two different strands of recent scholarship. First, in a
seminal article published in 1999, G. Edward White debunked what he called the “myth
of continuity,” and demonstrated that there was a radical transformation in the
constitutional regime of foreign relations in the period between the two World Wars.13
His article focused on three topics: the status of executive agreements, federalism limits
on the treaty power, and foreign sovereign immunity. This article demonstrates that a
similar transformation is occurring now with respect to the judicial role in treaty
enforcement. Courts applying the Bork model invoke the “myth of continuity” by citing
nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions as authority. This article debunks that myth
by showing that nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions provide no support for the
Bork model. The current transformation of the judicial role in treaty enforcement is
incomplete because the Supreme Court has not endorsed the Bork model. If the Court
does endorse the Bork model in Hamdan and/or Sanchez-Llamas, it would advance the
trend described by Professor White: a trend of consolidating foreign relations power in
the federal executive branch at the expense of other constitutional actors.14
Second, Professors Vazquez and Flaherty have argued persuasively that the
Framers intended treaties to be self-executing.15 Article VI of the Constitution accords

12

The author intends to develop these normative claims more fully in a separate article. The primary
focus of this article is historical, not normative. Even so, it is important to foreshadow the normative
arguments to highlight the contemporary relevance of the historical analysis. For a brief defense of the
normative claims summarized above, see infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text.
13
G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1999).
14
As applied to the POW Convention, the Bork model diminishes the power of both Congress and
the federal judiciary. As applied to the VCCR, the Bork model diminishes the power of both state and
federal courts. It effectively enhances the power of state governments to violate federal law, but it does so
in a way that is contrary to the central purpose of the Supremacy Clause. See infra notes 288-91 and
accompanying text.
15
See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and
Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos M. Vazquez, TreatyBased Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-1114 (1992). But see John C.
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (contending that the Framers’ original understanding is consistent with a
presumption against self-execution).
In contrast to Professors Flaherty, Vazquez and Yoo, this article purposefully avoids use of the
term “self-executing.” Instead, it frames the issue in terms of whether particular treaty provisions are
judicially enforceable, or whether individual litigants have the capacity to enforce treaties. There are two
reasons for this approach. First, debates about self-execution tend to conflate at least three distinct
questions: whether a treaty has the status of law in the U.S. legal system, whether it is judicially
enforceable, and whether it creates a private right of action. Second, recent cases involving the VCCR
typically hold that the VCCR is not judicially enforceable, even though it is admittedly “self-executing.”
These cases demonstrate that analysis of self-execution does not necessarily resolve the question whether a
treaty is judicially enforceable.
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treaties the status of law in the U.S. legal system.16 Articles III and VI empower federal
and state courts, respectively, to enforce treaties.17 Professors Vazquez and Flaherty have
examined a variety of Founding era sources to demonstrate that the Framers understood
the Constitution to mean what it says: that treaties have the status of law and courts have
the power to enforce treaties.18 It is clear, however, that all people cannot enforce all
treaties in all cases. Thus, the question remains: in what circumstances can individual
litigants invoke the power of a court to obtain remedies for treaty violations? The
constitutional text does not answer this question. The traditional sources of originalist
scholarship – records of the constitutional convention, state ratifying conventions, etc. –
shed some light on the question,19 but not much. Since eighteenth century materials are
inconclusive in this respect, it is instructive to examine judicial decisions from the postFounding period to ascertain whether they illuminate the Framers’ understanding of the
judicial role in treaty enforcement.20
This is the first article to present a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court
decisions between 1789 and 1838 in cases where an individual litigant raised a claim or
defense on the basis of a treaty. The analysis demonstrates that, during this period, the
Supreme Court routinely applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial
remedies for violations of individual treaty rights; it never applied the Borkian
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. That conclusion is significant for
two reasons. First, for those who believe that courts should decide cases in accordance
with the original understanding, it provides evidence that the Founders understood the
judicial role in treaty enforcement in accordance with the Marshall model, not the Bork
model.21 Second, for those who value judicial precedent over original intent, it
documents the “front end” of a two-hundred year tradition in which the Supreme Court
has consistently applied the Marshall model.22
16

U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land.”)
17
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising
under . . . Treaties.”); U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (specifying that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by
treaties).
18
See Flaherty, supra note 15; Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1097-1114.
19
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 22, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The
treaties of the United states, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial
determinations.”).
20
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the force of constitutional precedents “tends to increase
in proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969).
21
I do not claim that the analysis of Supreme Court decisions in the first fifty years of constitutional
history provides conclusive proof of the Framers’ original understanding. Even so, the analysis is
instructive because it shows a consistent pattern of judicial decision-making that conforms to the Marshall
model. That consistent pattern reinforces the conclusions that Professors Flaherty and Vazquez reached by
examining Founding-era sources. Additionally, analysis of judicial decisions enables one to draw more
specific conclusions about the circumstances in which individual litigants can obtain judicial remedies for
treaty violations.
22
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive analysis of two centuries of
Supreme Court jurisprudence in treaty cases. The author plans to conduct that analysis in future work. This
article demonstrates that the Supreme Court consistently applied the Marshall model, not the Bork model,

4

Judge Bork’s Anti-Originalist Revolution
David Sloss

March 2006

Part One provides a conceptual overview of the distinction between the Bork
model and the Marshall model. The models diverge in two distinct but related ways.
First, at the constitutional level, the Marshall model presupposes that state and federal
courts have fairly substantial powers to enforce treaties; in contrast, the Bork model
assumes that courts have relatively limited power to enforce treaties. Second, at the subconstitutional level, the comparison illustrates a dramatic transformation that has
occurred in the way courts conceptualize the relationship between individual rights and
judicial remedies. Application of the Marshall model leaves almost no gap between
rights and remedies in the domestic law of treaties, because courts applying the Marshall
model presume “that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . .
whenever that right is invaded.”23 In contrast, application of the Bork model leads to a
significant gap between rights and remedies, because courts applying the Bork model
presume, absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, that the treaty makers do not want
U.S. courts to provide remedies for violations of individual treaty rights.
Part Two presents a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court decisions between
1789 and 1838 -- the first fifty years of U.S. constitutional history -- in cases where an
individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty. There were fiftyseven such cases altogether. Analysis of these cases demonstrates that every Supreme
Court decision during this period was consistent with the Marshall model. In contrast, at
least thirteen of the fifty-seven cases, and arguably as many as nineteen cases, are
inconsistent with the Bork model. The consistent precedents of the Supreme Court
during this period manifest the Founders’ original understanding that the judiciary has
both the power and the duty to provide remedies for individuals whose treaty-based
individual rights are violated, even if the treaty does not create a private right of action,
and even if Congress has not enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the
treaty in domestic courts.
Part Three traces the origins of the Bork model. The analysis suggests that the
Bork model emerged in the 1970s and 1980s when lower federal courts combined two
previously separate lines of cases: one related to the doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties, and the other related to implied rights of action. The merger of these two
doctrines produced a revolution in both non-self-execution doctrine and implied right of
action doctrine. Whereas prior non-self-execution doctrine was generally consistent with
the maxim “where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Borkian non-self-execution
doctrine created a huge right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties. Whereas
implied right of action doctrine, as applied in the statutory context, has never imposed a
bar to judicial enforcement of federal statutes on behalf of habeas petitioners or criminal
defendants, courts are now applying the Borkian private right of action test to preclude
habeas petitioners and criminal defendants from obtaining judicial remedies for violations
of their individual treaty rights.
during the first fifty years of constitutional history. It also shows that the Supreme Court cases most
frequently cited as authority for the Bork model do not support the Borkian presumption against private
enforcement of treaties. On the basis of this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the Supreme Court has
continued to apply the Marshall model for more than two hundred years.
23
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries).
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Two Models of Treaty Adjudication

This article utilizes the conceptual tools of the Bork model and the Marshall
model to frame the historical analysis. Part One lays the groundwork for that analysis by
providing a conceptual overview of the distinction between the Bork model and the
Marshall model. To clarify that distinction, it is first necessary to discuss briefly the
relationship between primary law and remedial law.
A.

Rights and Remedies

A primary legal rule specifies what the lawmaker “expects or hopes to happen
when the arrangement works successfully.”24 A remedial rule, in contrast, “directs that a
certain consequence, or sanction, may or shall follow upon an acknowledgment or formal
official determination of noncompliance with the relevant primary provision.”25
According to Hart & Sacks, the concept of a primary duty is “the central conception of
regulatory law.”26 A primary duty is “an authoritatively recognized obligation . . . not to
do something, or to do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way.”27
A primary right “is the mere obverse of the duty.”28 Thus, an individual has a
primary right under a treaty if the treaty imposes a duty on the state party “not to do
something” to that individual, “or to do it” for that individual, “or to do it if at all only in
a prescribed way.” For the purposes of this article, therefore, a treaty “protects individual
rights,” or “creates individual rights,” if an individual has a primary right under the
treaty. Treaties frequently create or protect individual rights. Under the Marshall model,
treaty provisions that protect individual rights are generally judicially enforceable,
regardless of whether the treaty creates an express private right of action.
Whereas legal rules that create or protect individual rights are primary legal rules,
legal provisions that create private rights of action are remedial legal rules. A private
right of action, according to Hart & Sacks, “is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a
[court] . . . upon a disputed question about the application of [primary rules] and to
secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.”29 Under
this definition, a treaty creates an express private right of action if it expressly empowers
individuals to invoke the treaty before a domestic court to obtain the court’s judgment
about a disputed question related to the treaty.30
24

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122 (1994) hereinafter HART & SACKS].
25
Id. at 122.
26
Id. at 130.
27
Id. at 130.
28
Id. at 137.
29
Id.
30
Some modern treaties expressly authorize individuals to invoke the treaty before an international
tribunal. Such treaty provisions would satisfy Hart & Sacks’ definition of a private right of action. Since
this article focuses on judicial enforcement of treaties in domestic courts, though, this article defines the
term “private right of action” with respect to domestic courts, not international tribunals.
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In contrast to Hart & Sacks, some courts applying the Bork model appear to
understand the concept of a “private right of action” to encompass two distinct ideas: a
right of access to court, and a power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this article, a treaty creates a private right of action if it
grants an individual a right of access to domestic court or it empowers the individual to
invoke the treaty before that court. (Where appropriate, the article will distinguish
between a “right of access” and a “power to invoke”.) Treaties rarely create express
private rights of action.31 Under the Bork model, a treaty that does not create an express
private right of action is generally not judicially enforceable, even if the treaty protects
individual rights.
B.

Marshall v. Bork

1. Different Presumptions: In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,32 Robert Bork,
then a federal appellate judge, wrote:
Treaties of the United States, though the law of the land, do not generally
create rights that are privately enforceable in courts. Absent authorizing
legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s
provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly
or impliedly provides a private right of action. When no right is explicitly
stated, courts look to the treaty as a whole to determine whether it
evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.33
In the first sentence, the phrase “rights that are privately enforceable in courts”
clearly refers to remedial rights, not primary rights. Thus, under the Bork model, there is
a presumption that individuals are not entitled to domestic judicial remedies for violations
of individual treaty rights. The second sentence makes clear that there are two ways, and
only two ways, to overcome that presumption: a) if there is “authorizing legislation” that
empowers courts to grant judicial remedies; or b) if the treaty itself “provides a private
right of action.” The second and third sentences, read together, make clear that a treatybased private right of action could be either express or implied. Either way, though,
under the Bork model, there is a presumption against judicial remedies for treaty
violations, and the individual invoking a treaty before a domestic court has the burden of
overcoming that presumption.
The Marshall model, in contrast, adopts a presumption in favor of domestic
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights.34 The core principle of the
31

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907, cmt.
a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“International agreements, even those directly benefiting private
persons, generally do not . . . provide a private cause of action in domestic courts.”)
32
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
33
Id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring).
34
Strictly speaking, the presumption applies only if the treaty provision at issue is the “Law of
Land” under the Supremacy Clause. Under the express terms of the Constitution, every treaty “made under
the Authority of the United States” is the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. For a
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Marshall model is “that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . .
whenever that right is invaded.”35 The Marshall model does not adopt a presumption for
or against the view that treaties create individual rights, but it recognizes that some
treaties do create individual rights. Whether a treaty creates or protects individual rights
is a question of treaty interpretation.36 If a treaty does create or protect individual rights,
the Marshall model presumes that an individual whose treaty rights were violated is
entitled to a domestic judicial remedy.37 That presumption can be overcome if the treaty
explicitly bars domestic judicial remedies, or if Congress has enacted legislation
expressly precluding judicial enforcement of the treaty. The mere failure of the political
branches to create an express private right of action, however, is not a bar to judicial
enforcement of a treaty provision that protects individual rights.
Treaties can be invoked defensively by civil or criminal defendants, or they can
be invoked offensively by plaintiffs. A civil or criminal defendant does not need a right
of access to court because he has been haled into court against his will. Thus, when
courts applying the Bork model suggest that an individual defendant requires a “private
right of action” to enforce a treaty, they presumably mean that the defendant requires a
power to invoke the treaty, not a right of access to court.38 Under the Marshallian
presumption in favor of judicial enforcement, an individual defendant whose rights are
protected by a treaty is presumed to have the power to invoke that treaty before a
domestic court, absent countervailing action by the political branches. Under the Borkian
presumption against judicial enforcement, though, individual defendants lack the power
to invoke treaties, even treaties that protect individual rights, unless the political branches
have taken affirmative steps to grant individuals that power.
Apart from the power to invoke a treaty, individual plaintiffs must also establish a
right of access to court. During the Marshall era, individual plaintiffs routinely relied on
common law rights of action to provide a right of access to court to pursue their treatybased claims.39 Thus, under the Marshall model, if a plaintiff can show that he has rights
detailed textual analysis of this constitutional provision, see David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 46-55 (2002). Unless otherwise specified, this
article is concerned only with treaty provisions that are “Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause.
35
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting William
Blackstone, 3 Commentaries xxx).
36
See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2103 (O’Connor, J., dissenting on other grounds)
(“To ascertain whether Article 36 [of the VCCR] confers a right on individuals, we first look to the treaty’s
text as we would with a statute’s.”).
37
See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“But a treaty may
also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations
residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.”).
38
See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-76 (Or. 2005) (suggesting, in a case where a
criminal defendant sought to invoke the VCCR as the basis for a defense in a criminal proceeding, that
treaties are “enforceable by individuals” only if the “treaty as a whole” manifests an intent to create “an
individual right of action”).
39
See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489 (1824) (suit to foreclose on mortgage); Soc’y for
Propagation of Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823) (action for ejectment); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S.
594 (1818) (equitable action to divide a tract of land); Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. 259 (1817)
(action for ejectment); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. 185 (1808) (suit for breach of contract);
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protected by a treaty, and he has a right of access to court based on common law or other
domestic law sources, there is no additional showing required to establish that he has the
power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court. Under the Bork model, though, even
if a plaintiff has rights protected by a treaty, and even if a federal statute grants him a
right of access to U.S. courts, he must still identify some other statutory or treaty
provision that grants him the power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court.40
In sum, the two models apply opposing presumptions in cases where an individual
litigant seeks judicial enforcement of a treaty that protects individual rights, but that does
not create an express private right of action. Under the Bork model, courts exceed their
authority if they grant remedies to individuals for violations of such treaties, unless
Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the treaty. Under the
Marshall model, courts abdicate their responsibility if they refuse to grant remedies for
violations of such treaties, unless the treaty explicitly bars domestic judicial remedies, or
Congress has enacted legislation expressly precluding judicial enforcement of the treaty.
2.
Different Methodologies: In a famous speech in 1897, Oliver Wendell
Holmes declared that it puts “the cart before the horse . . . to consider the right or the duty
as something existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to
which certain sanctions are added afterward.”41 In an equally famous critique of Holmes,
Henry Hart stated: “Holmes’ ‘cart’ is the horse and his ‘horse’ is the cart. . . . The
remedial parts of law – rights of action and other sanctions – are subsidiary. To the
primary parts they have the relation of means to ends. They come second not first.”42
Courts applying the Bork model are the intellectual descendants of Holmes. They
typically begin by asking questions about remedial law, not primary law. Under the
Borkian method, it would be inappropriate for a court to consider whether a treaty
protects individual rights, or whether those rights have been violated, until after the court
has determined that the individual has a private right of action. If the individual lacks a
private right of action, then the individual is not entitled to a judicial remedy in any case,
so it would be a waste of judicial resources to attempt to answer questions about primary
rights.
Courts applying the Marshall model, by contrast, can be viewed as the intellectual
predecessors or descendants of Henry Hart. They typically begin by asking questions
about primary law, not remedial law, because the “remedial parts of law . . . come second
not first.”43 Under the Marshallian method, it is not necessary to inquire whether the
Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. 415 (1808) (suit to foreclose on mortgage); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806)
(suit to recover payment on bond); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804) (suit to recover payment on
bond).
40
This is the logic of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005). The petitioner filed a habeas petition to enforce his rights under the POW Convention. The D.C.
Circuit said: “The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on a private right of action .
. . but it does not render a treaty judicially enforceable.” Id. at 40.
41
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897).
42
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism – An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 935 (1951).
43
Id.
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treaty creates a private right of action, because every individual who is properly before
the court44 and whose individual treaty rights have been violated is entitled to a judicial
remedy, assuming that the political branches have not foreclosed judicial remedies. By
deciding explicitly that the individual’s rights have been violated, the court also decides
(implicitly, at least) that the individual is entitled to a remedy. Of course, individual
cases may raise difficult questions about the appropriate remedy. In the vast majority of
cases, though, the central question of remedial law – whether the individual is entitled to
some remedy – does not require separate analysis, because the court answers that
question by deciding whether the individual’s primary rights have been violated.45
In short, the Marshall model applies a “rights-focused” methodology, whereas the
Bork model applies a “remedies-focused” methodology. The contrast between the
Marshallian and Borkian methodologies has tremendous practical significance because
treaties rarely create an express private right of action, and Congress rarely enacts
legislation authorizing individuals to enforce a specific treaty. Therefore, if the Supreme
Court endorses the Bork model, it will lead to a substantial right-remedy gap in the
domestic law of treaties. If the Supreme Court continues to apply the Marshall model,
though, it would minimize the right-remedy gap, because most treaties that protect
individual rights would be judicially enforceable.
II.
The Marshall Model in Action: 1789-1838
Part Two presents a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court decisions between
1789 and 1838 in which an individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a
treaty. The year 1838 provides an appropriate closing date for this analysis. To present a
complete picture of the Marshall model, it is necessary to extend the analysis at least until
1835, the last year that John Marshall served on the Court. If the analysis stops in 1835,
though, one loses an important part of the picture. Judge Bork and others have relied
heavily on Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson46 to support the Bork model.47 In
Garcia v. Lee,48 decided in 1838, Chief Justice Taney authored an opinion that helps
illuminate Marshall’s inscrutable analysis in Foster.
Thus, to obtain a clear
understanding of Marshall’s opinion in Foster – and to demonstrate conclusively that
Foster provides no support for the Bork model – it is essential to analyze the aftermath of
Foster up through and including Taney’s 1838 decision in Garcia v. Lee.
44

An individual defendant is properly before the court if he is subject to the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Under the Marshall model, an individual plaintiff is properly before the court if there is some
provision of law – common law, statute, treaty, or other – that grants him a right of access to court.
45
Under the Marshall model, there are three circumstances in which an individual whose treaty
rights were violated is not entitled to a remedy: 1) if the political branches have taken affirmative action to
limit judicial remedies; 2) if the individual did not suffer any harm or prejudice as a result of the treaty
violation; or 3) if the defendant is protected by an affirmative defense, such as sovereign immunity.
46
27 U.S. 253 (1829).
47
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d at 38-39 (citing Foster); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (citing Foster); State v. SanchezLlamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005) (citing Foster).
48
37 U.S. 511 (1838).
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Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided 57 cases in which an
individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty.49 These 57 cases
include: 22 cases involving disputes over title to property in Louisiana or Florida
(territories that the U.S. acquired by treaties with France and Spain, respectively); 16
other cases involving disputes over title to real property; 11 admiralty cases; and 8 cases
that are neither admiralty nor property cases.
Part Two analyzes the results of Supreme Court decisions during this period to
determine which results are consistent with the Marshall model and which results are
consistent with the Bork model. Since few cases explicitly endorse the core premises of
either model, it is necessary to examine what the Court did, as well as what the Court
said, to ascertain which cases are consistent with which model. The analysis shows that
every Supreme Court decision during this period was consistent with the Marshallian
presumption in favor of judicial remedies.50 In contrast, none of the 57 cases endorse the
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties. Moreover, there was not a
single Supreme Court decision during this period suggesting that individuals cannot
enforce treaties in the absence of a statutory or treaty-based right of action.
Part Two is divided into four sections. The first section analyzes cases in which
the party invoking the treaty won on the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total
of 34 cases. The second section addresses cases where the Court declined to reach the
merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total of 7 cases. The third section discusses
cases in which the party invoking the treaty lost on the merits of a treaty-based claim or
defense; there were 16 such cases. The final section examines one of those 16 cases,
Foster v. Neilson, in greater detail.
A.

Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Won on the Merits

49

This figure does not include cases involving treaties with Indian tribes. Only cases involving
treaties with foreign nations are included.
Cases where an individual plaintiff invoked a treaty in reply to a defense raised by the defendant
are included. However, cases where the Court cited a treaty as evidence supporting a contested
proposition, but where neither party asserted an individual right on the basis of that treaty, are excluded.
See, e.g., Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. 523 (1827) (where neither party asserted individual right on basis of
peace treaty between U.S. and Britain, Court cited treaty as evidence that land at issue was part of United
States in 1777).
The phrase “individual litigant” includes companies as well as natural persons. See, e.g., Soc’y for
Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823) (suit by British corporation). It also
includes individual officials of foreign governments who file suit to represent the interests of their
government, or of their country’s nationals. See, e.g., The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. 52 (1819) (petition filed
by Spanish consul on behalf of Spanish nationals). Since the article focuses on treaty enforcement by
individual litigants, cases where the adverse parties are both government entities are excluded. See, e.g.,
New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
50
Of the 57 treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided during this period, only three create a slight
right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties: Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410 (1838); Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. 253 (1829); and De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. 599 (1827). For the reasons explained below,
all three are consistent with the Marshall model. See infra notes 161-234 and accompanying text.
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Of the 57 treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided between 1789 and 1838,
the individual invoking the treaty won his treaty-based claim or defense 34 times.51
Those 34 cases are all consistent with the Marshall model because, in each case, the
Court enforced the treaty on behalf of an individual litigant. To determine whether the
cases are consistent with the Bork model, it is essential to determine whether the
individual invoking the treaty had a statutory or treaty-based right of action. Since the
Court almost never addressed this question in its opinions, it is necessary to look beyond
the text of the opinions to determine whether a particular case is consistent with the Bork
model.52 The cases divide into four groups: twelve cases where the individual litigant
had a statutory right of action;53 three cases where the treaty provided an express private
right of action;54 thirteen cases that are clearly inconsistent with the Bork model because
the Court awarded remedies on the basis of a treaty even though there was no statutory or
treaty-based right of action;55 and six cases that are arguably inconsistent with the Bork
model because there was no statutory right of action, and it is debatable whether the
treaty created a private right of action.56
1. Cases Involving a Statutory Right of Action: The United States acquired
Louisiana from France by a treaty signed in 1803.57 Under Article 3 of that treaty, the
United States promised that “[t]he inhabitants of the ceded territory . . . shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their . . . property.”58 At the time of
the acquisition, many individuals had private property rights based upon grants received
from prior French and Spanish governments. Congress, therefore, enacted legislation in
1805 that authorized the President to appoint commissioners to conduct hearings and
review evidence for the purpose of distinguishing between valid and invalid property
claims.59 Over the next two decades, Congress passed a series of laws regulating titles to

51

If a party who invokes a treaty wins the case, but loses on the treaty issue, that counts as a loss.
See, e.g., Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 (1830) (where British
company filed ejectment action against town, Court affirmed plaintiff’s right to recover possession of land,
but rejected plaintiff’s treaty-based claim for mesne profits). If both parties assert rights under a treaty, and
one party wins its treaty-based claim or defense, that counts as a win. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S.
133 (1795) (where Dutch ship owners sought to recover property captured by privateers who claimed to be
French, and captors invoked treaty with France as a bar to court’s jurisdiction, the Court rejected the
jurisdictional objection and ruled in favor of Dutch ship owners on the basis of a treaty with the
Netherlands).
52
The fact that the vast majority of Supreme Court opinions during this period did not even consider
whether the treaty at issue provided a private right of action is itself compelling evidence that the Court did
not endorse or apply the Bork model.
53
See infra Part II.A(1).
54
See infra Part II.A(2).
55
See infra Part II.A(3).
56
See infra Part II.A(4).
57
Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, April 30, 1803, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of America 498 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “Louisiana
Treaty”].
58
Id., art. 3, at 501.
59
See “An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land, within the territory of
Orleans, and the district of Louisiana,” March 2, 1805, sec. 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327.
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land in the territory acquired from France.60 Ultimately, in 1824, Congress created a
federal statutory cause of action authorizing individuals who claimed property rights
“protected or secured by the treaty between the United States of America and the French
republic . . . to present a petition to the district court of the state of Missouri.”61 During
the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided three cases where plaintiffs asserting a claim on
the basis of this federal statute won on the merits of those claims.62
The United States acquired Florida from Spain by a treaty signed in 1819.63
Under Article 8 of that treaty, the United States promised to respect the property rights of
individuals who had valid titles based on prior Spanish land grants.64 Congress wanted to
implement that treaty obligation, while simultaneously establishing safeguards to prevent
the distribution of large tracts of land to individuals with fraudulent claims. Accordingly,
in 1822, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the President to appoint commissioners
to conduct hearings and review evidence for the purpose of distinguishing between valid
and invalid property claims.65 The initial statutory scheme was purely administrative,
with no provision for judicial review. In 1828, though, Congress created a federal
statutory cause of action for individuals who claimed property rights protected by Article
8 of the Florida Treaty.66 During the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided nine cases where

60

See Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to Louisiana, 43 Mississippi
Valley Historical Review No. 1, 39-58 (1956); Harry L. Coles, Jr., The Confirmation of Foreign Land
Titles in Louisiana, 38 Louisiana Historical Quarterly No. 4, 1-22 (1955). See also 2 Stat. 324-25
(summarizing legislation from 1804 to 1843).
61
An Act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the state of Missouri and territory of
Arkansas to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims,” May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 52. The statute
says, in relevant part:
That it shall and may be lawful for any person . . . claiming lands . . . within the state of
Missouri, by virtue of any French or Spanish grant . . . which was protected or secured by
the treaty between the United States of America and the French republic . . . to present a
petition to the district court of the state of Missouri . . . and the said court is hereby
authorized and required to hold and exercise jurisdiction of every petition, presented in
conformity with the provisions of this act . . . .
62
Mackey v. U.S., 35 U.S. 340 (1836); Soulard’s Heirs v. U.S., 35 U.S. 100 (1836); Delassus v.
U.S., 34 U.S. 117 (1835).
63
Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, reprinted in 3 Treaties and
Other International Acts of the United States of America 3 (Hunter Miller ed., 1933) [hereinafter, “Florida
Treaty”].
64
Id., art. 8, at 9 (“All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by His Catholic
Majesty or by his lawful authorities in the said Territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, shall
be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands . . . .”)
65
See “An Act for ascertaining claims and titles to land within the territory of Florida,” May 8, 1822,
3 Stat. 709.
66
See “An act supplementary to the several acts providing for the settlement and confirmation of
private land claims in Florida,” May 23, 1828, 4 Stat. 284. Section 6 of the Act says:
That all claims to land within the territory of Florida, embraced by the treaty between
Spain and the United States . . . shall be received and adjudicated by the judge of the
superior court of the district within which the land lies, upon the petition of the claimant,
according to the forms, rules, regulations, conditions, restrictions, and limitations
prescribed to the district judge, and claimants in the state of Missouri” by the act of May
26, 1824.
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plaintiffs asserting a claim on the basis of this federal statute won on the merits of their
treaty-based claims.67
All twelve cases where plaintiffs prevailed (three Missouri cases and nine Florida
cases) are consistent with the Marshall model because the court granted remedies to the
individual plaintiffs to protect their treaty-based rights. All twelve cases are also
consistent with the Bork model, because Congress had enacted federal statutes
authorizing judicial enforcement of those claims.68 Even so, none of the cases endorse
the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties.
2. Cases Involving a Treaty-Based Right of Action: In Higginson v. Mein,69 a
British mortgagee sued to foreclose on a mortgage related to land in Georgia. The State
of Georgia had confiscated the mortgaged property during the Revolutionary War.70 The
British plaintiff invoked Article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, which protected the
rights of “all Persons who have any Interest in confiscated Lands, either by Debts,
Marriage Settlements, or otherwise.”71 Article 5 granted the plaintiff an express private
right of action.72 The Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff.
The Bello Corrunes73 and The Pizarro74 were both admiralty cases involving
disputes between U.S. captors and Spanish ship owners. In both cases, Article XX of the
1795 Treaty with Spain granted Spanish ship owners an express private right of action
authorizing suits in U.S. courts.75 In both cases, the Court awarded judgment to the
67

U.S. v. Sibbald, 35 U.S. 313 (1836); U.S. v. Seton, 35 U.S. 309 (1836); U.S. v. Fernandez, 35 U.S.
303 (1836); Mitchel v. U.S., 34 U.S. 711 (1835); U.S. v. Clarke, 34 U.S. 168 (1835); U.S. v. Huertas, 33
U.S. 488 (1834) (plaintiff wins claim for 11,000 acres but loses claim for 4000 acres); U.S. v. Clarke, 33
U.S. 436 (1834) (plaintiff wins claim for 8000 acres but loses claim for other land); U.S. v. Percheman, 32
U.S. 51 (1833); U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832).
68
Since all twelve cases involved claims against the United States, plaintiffs relied on federal
statutes to overcome what would otherwise be a valid sovereign immunity defense.
69
8 U.S. 415 (1808).
70
Id. at 418-19.
71
Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. 5, U.S.-Great Britain, reprinted in 2 Treaties and
Other International Acts of the United States of America, 151, 154 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
72
See id., art. 5 (“And it is agreed that all Persons who have any Interest in confiscated Lands . . .
shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the Prosecution of their just Rights.”)
The text states explicitly that persons “shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the Prosecution of
their just Rights.” The text also identifies the persons to whom it applies: those “who have any Interest in
confiscated Lands.” The treaty specifically authorizes them to prosecute “their just rights” in the
confiscated lands, which are restored by article 5. It is difficult to imagine what else the treaty drafters
would have to say in order to satisfy the Borkian requirement for a private right of action. In contrast,
neither article 4 nor article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace creates an express private right of action.
For analysis of those articles, see infra notes 98-119 and 128-39 and accompanying text.
73
19 U.S. 152 (1821).
74
15 U.S. 227 (1817).
75
Treaty of Frienship, Limits and Navigation, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 20, U.S.-Spain, reprinted in 2
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 318, 334-35 (Hunter Miller ed.,
1931) [hereinafter, “1795 Treaty with Spain”] (“It is also agreed that the inhabitants of the territories of
each party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the other, and they shall be
permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their properties . . . and for obtaining satisfaction for the
damages which they may have sustained . . . .”).
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Spanish ship owners on the grounds that American privateers who captured the ships had
violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain.76
Higginson, Bello Corrunes, and Pizarro are all consistent with the Marshall
model because, in each case, the Court awarded a remedy to an individual victim of a
treaty violation. All three cases are also consistent with the Bork model because the
treaties at issue granted the individual litigants an express private right of action. None of
these cases, however, endorse the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of
treaties. Moreover, none of the cases state or imply that individual litigants could not
enforce the treaty in the absence of a treaty-based right of action.
3. Cases in Which There was no Express Private Right of Action: The Supreme
Court decided thirteen cases between 1789 and 1838 in which an individual litigant won
on the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, even though the treaty at issue did not
create an express private right of action, and Congress had not enacted legislation
authorizing private enforcement of the treaty in domestic courts. The thirteen cases
include three admiralty cases,77 five cases involving creditor-debtor disputes,78 and five
other cases.79 In all thirteen cases, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in
favor of judicial remedies. In every case, the Court would have reached a different result
if it had applied the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies. Thus, these cases are
clearly inconsistent with the Bork model; they provide strong support for the Marshall
model.
a. Admiralty Cases: In Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne,80 a French privateer
had captured a British vessel. The British Consul filed a libel, seeking restitution on the
grounds that the French privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port. In
response, the privateer invoked article 19 of a 1778 treaty with France,81 which granted
the privateer a right to enter a U.S. port for repairs. The Court held that the treaty
protected the privateer’s activities in this case.82 Accordingly, the Court awarded
judgment to the French privateer on the basis of the treaty, even though the treaty at issue
76

See Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. at 171-72 (holding that the privateer had violated article XIV of the
1795 treaty with Spain), and at 154-55 (noting that the Circuit court had ordered restoration of the ship to
the Spanish owners) and at 175-76 (affirming the Circuit court order in all relevant respects); Pizarro, 15
U.S. at 242-47 (holding that the capture violated article XV of the 1795 treaty with Spain, and ordering
restitution of the ship to the Spanish owners).
77
U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. 319 (1796);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795).
78
Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I);
Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); State of Georgia v. Brailsford,
3 U.S. 1 (1794).
79
Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. 1 (1830); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825); Soc’y for Propagation
of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. 259 (1817);
Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co., 8 U.S. 185 (1808).
80
3 U.S. 319 (1796).
81
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, art. 19, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and
Other International Acts of the United States of America 3, 17-18 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter,
“1778 Treaty with France”].
82
See Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. at 319.
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did not create an express private right of action,83 and there was no federal statute, other
than the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that authorized the prevailing party to
enforce the treaty in a U.S. court.
Talbot v. Jansen involved a Dutch brigantine, the Magdalena, which had been
captured by privateers.84 The Dutch ship owners argued that the capture violated article
19 of a 1782 treaty with the Netherlands.85 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Dutch ship owners,86 producing four separate opinions in support of that result. Two of
the four opinions held expressly that the capture violated the 1782 Treaty with the
Netherlands, and that the ship owners were entitled to a remedy on that basis.87 As in
Moodie, the Court granted a remedy to the ship owners even though the treaty at issue did
not create an express private right of action,88 and there was no federal statute, other than
the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that authorized the ship owners to enforce the
treaty in a U.S. court.
Moodie and Talbot are both consistent with the Marshall model, but they are
squarely inconsistent with the Bork model. In accordance with the Marshall model, the
Court assumed that the treaties at issue were judicially enforceable on behalf of private
parties,89 even though the treaties did not expressly empower individuals to invoke those
treaties before a U.S. court. Contrary to the Bork model, the absence of any statutory or
treaty provision that expressly authorized private enforcement was not a bar to private
enforcement of the treaty.
83

Article 19 of the 1778 treaty with France protects the right of French mariners who seek shelter in
U.S. ports to obtain “all things needful for . . . reparation of their Ships” and to “depart when and whither
they please without any let or hindrance.” 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 81, art. 19. The treaty does
not contain any language that expressly empowers French citizens to invoke that provision before a U.S.
court.
84
3 U.S. 133 (1795).
85
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, art. 19, U.S.-Netherlands, reprinted in 2 Treaties
and Other International Acts of the United States of America 59, 76-77 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931)
[hereinafter, “1782 Treaty with Netherlands”]. Article 19 prohibited U.S. citizens from accepting a
commission from any state at war with the Netherlands “for arming any Ship or Ships, to act as Privateers”
against Dutch ships. One of the captors, Talbot, was allegedly a U.S. citizen who had accepted a
commission from France, which was at war with the Netherlands. Talbot claimed that article 19 did not
apply to him because he had renounced his U.S. citizenship, and acquired French citizenship. Justice
Paterson, who wrote one of the two main opinions in the case, would have resolved the case on other
grounds, without deciding whether Talbot was a French citizen. See Talbot, 3 U.S. at 152-58 (Paterson, J.).
Justice Iredell, who wrote the other main opinion in the case, held squarely that Talbot was a U.S. citizen.
See id. at 161-65 (Iredell, J.).
86
Id. at 169.
87
See id. at 165 (Iredell, J.) (concluding that Talbot had a “duty of not cruising against the Dutch, in
violation of the law of nations, generally, and of the treaty with Holland, in particular”); id. at 169
(Rutledge, C.J.) (stating that the capture “was a violation of the law of nations, and of the treaty with
Holland”).
88
Article 19 provides expressly that any individual who violates its terms “shall be punished as a
pirate.” 1782 Treaty with Netherlands, supra note 85, art. 19, at 76-77. The treaty does not provide for
civil actions against individuals who commit acts of piracy.
89
See Moodie, 3 U.S. at 319 (Elsworth, C.J.) (“Suggestions of policy and conveniency cannot be
considered in the judicial determination of a question of right: the treaty with France . . . must have its
effect.”)
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In United States v. Schooner Peggy,90 the Court ruled in favor of the French
owners of a schooner captured by a U.S. naval vessel, holding that Article 4 of the 1800
Convention with France granted the French owners a right to recover the captured
property.91 Article 4 granted the French owners a primary right to regain possession of
the ship, but it did not explicitly empower them to enforce that right in a U.S. court.92
Nor was there any federal statute, other than the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction,
that authorized the French ship owners to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court. One could
argue that Article 22 of the 1800 Convention with France granted the French ship owners
a private right of action.93 It is unlikely, though, that Article 22 was intended to create a
private right of action.94 Moreover, even if one reads Article 22 to create a right of
action, it is questionable whether that right of action applied to cases, such as Schooner
Peggy, implicating Article 4 of the treaty.95
In any case, the Court’s opinion makes no reference to Article 22, and does not
rely on that treaty provision as a basis for a private right of action. Rather, the Court’s
rationale was that “[t]he court is as much bound as the executive to take notice of a treaty,
and will . . . decree restoration of the property under the treaty.”96 In accordance with the
Marshall model, the Court assumed that Article 4 was judicially enforceable by private
parties, even though that article did not expressly empower individuals to invoke the
treaty before a U.S. court. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme
law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United
States must be admitted. . . . [W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as
90

5 U.S. 103 (1801).
See id. at 108-110.
92
Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America, Sept. 30, 1800, art. 4,
U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 457, 45962 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “1800 Convention with France”] (stipulating that “property
captured, and not yet definitively condemned . . . shall be mutually restored”).
93
See id., art. 22 (“It is further agreed that in all cases, the established courts for Prize Causes, in the
Country to which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them.”).
94
During the 1790s, there were a series of cases in which French nationals challenged the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to adjudicate prize cases involving French captors. See, e.g., Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 9 (1794) (French captor asserts “[t]hat by the law of nations, the courts of the captor can
alone determine the question of prize or no prize”). The United States, on the other hand, claimed that
prize cases involving French captors were subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if captors brought the
ship into a U.S. port. See id., at 16 (rejecting the French captor’s jurisdictional objection and affirming the
jurisdiction of the district court). The stipulation in article 22 – authorizing courts in the country to which
the prizes may be conducted to take cognizance of cases – was probably added to the treaty to resolve this
issue, rather than to create a private right of action.
95
The 1800 Convention with France served two distinct goals. First, it was a peace treaty that
terminated the undeclared war between the U.S. and France. Articles 1-5 were backward-looking and were
intended to codify the termination of the war. Second, Articles 6-27 were forward looking and were
designed to govern future relations. Hence, the word “cases” in Article 22 may have been intended to
include only the admiralty cases addressed in articles 6-27, not the cases implicating article 4, which
addressed property captured during the war.
96
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 103-04.
91
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such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much
binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of
congress; and . . . to condemn a vessel, the restoration of which is directed
by a law of the land, would be a direct infraction of that law, and of
consequence improper.97
In Marshall’s view, it was immaterial whether the treaty created a private right of action
because the Court had a duty under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the treaty on behalf
of the French ship owners. Thus, Schooner Peggy is inconsistent with the Bork model.
b. Creditor-Debtor Disputes: During the period under study, the Supreme Court
decided five cases in which it awarded judgment to British creditors on the basis of
article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. Ware v. Hylton98 is representative of these
cases. In Ware, a British creditor sued U.S. debtors to collect payment on a bond that
dated from 1774.99 In 1777, during the Revolutionary War, the Virginia legislature
“passed a law to sequester British property.”100 In 1780, pursuant to that Virginia law,
the U.S. debtors paid a portion of their debt into a loan office established by the State of
Virginia. After the war was over, when the British creditor sued to recover payment on
the bond, the defendants pled the Virginia law, and their payment into the loan office, as
a bar to the suit.101 In reply to that defense, the plaintiff invoked Article 4 of the peace
treaty.102 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff, holding that “the 4th
article of the said treaty nullifies the law of Virginia . . .; destroys the payment made
under it; and revives the debt.”103 The Court applied a Marshallian presumption in favor
of judicial remedies, granting a remedy to the British plaintiff, despite the fact that neither
the treaty nor a federal statute granted the plaintiff a private right of action.104
In addition to Ware, the Supreme Court decided three other cases implicating
Article 4 in which British creditors sued U.S. debtors to recover debts that had been
confiscated or sequestered during the Revolutionary War.105 In one other case, the State
of Georgia sued a British creditor, and the creditor invoked Article 4 defensively to assert
his entitlement to a debt sequestered during the war.106 In all four cases, the Court ruled
in favor of the British creditors.107 Like Ware, these cases are inconsistent with the Bork
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Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 109-110 (Marshall, C.J.).
3 U.S. 199 (1796).
99
Id. at 199.
100
Id. at 220 (Chase, J.).
101
Id. at 221.
102
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts
heretofore contracted”).
103
Ware, 3 U.S. at 235 (Chase, J.).
104
The plaintiff’s suit was based on the common law right of action to recover payment on a bond.
105
Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I);
Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804).
106
State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
107
Hopkirk II, 8 U.S. 164 (reaffirming Hopkirk I); Hopkirk I, 7 U.S. 454 (ordering debtor to pay debt
wrongfully withheld from creditor in violation of article 4 of Definitive Treaty of Peace); Ogden, 6 U.S.
98
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model because the Court granted remedies to British creditors even though Article 4 did
not grant the creditors a private right of action, and there was no federal statute that
empowered British creditors to invoke the treaty before a U.S. court.
Defenders of the Bork model might contend that Article 4 does create a private
right of action. The treaty states explicitly “that Creditors on either Side shall meet with
no lawful Impediment to the Recovery . . . of all bona fide Debts heretofore contracted.”
This language, one could argue, manifests the drafters’ expectation that private
individuals could enforce the treaty in domestic courts. Moreover, the Court stated
explicitly in Ware that the phrase “to the Recovery” refers “to the right of action,
judgment, and execution. . . . The word recovery is very comprehensive and operates, in
the present case, to give remedy from the commencement of suit, to the receipt of the
money.”108 Thus, one could argue, Ware and the other Article 4 cases are consistent with
the Bork model because they are cases where the treaty itself created a private right of
action.
This argument is not persuasive. The express language of Article 4 says nothing
about courts or lawsuits; it merely refers to recovery of debts.109 Hart & Sacks would
characterize Article 4 as a primary rule because it specifies what the treaty drafters expect
“to happen when the arrangement works successfully.”110 It is not a remedial rule
because it does not specify “that a certain consequence, or sanction, may or shall follow
upon . . . noncompliance with the relevant primary provision.”111 In this respect, Article
4 differs markedly from provisions of other contemporaneous treaties that create an
express private right of action. Unlike those treaty provisions, which expressly require
enforcement in domestic courts,112 the United States could have fulfilled its obligations
under Article 4 without any judicial involvement.113
272 (same); Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (holding that article 4 of Definitive Treaty of Peace protected British
defendant’s right to recover debt).
108
Ware, 3 U.S. at 241. See also Brailsford, 3 U.S. at 5 (stating that “the very terms of the treaty,
revived the right of action to recover the debt”).
109
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts
heretofore contracted”).
110
Hart & Sacks, supra note 24, at 122.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., 1795 Treaty with Spain, supra note 75, art. 20, at 334-35 (“It is also agreed that the
inhabitants of the territories of each party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the
other, and they shall be permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their properties . . . and for
obtaining satisfaction for the damages which they may have sustained . . . .”).
113
In fact, the U.S. later agreed on non-judicial means to execute its obligations under Article 4
because British creditors had ongoing problems enforcing their rights in U.S. courts. See JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 741-56 (1971) (Volume I of The Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States) (recounting history of efforts by British
creditors to recover pre-war debts). The United States agreed in the 1794 Jay Treaty that “The United
States will make full and complete Compensation for” debts owed by U.S. citizens to British creditors. See
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, art. 6, U.S.-Great Britain, reprinted in 2
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, 245, 250 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931)
[hereinafter, “Jay Treaty”]. Moreover, the treaty established a bilateral U.S.-British arbitral tribunal that
provided a non-judicial forum where British creditors could enforce their rights protected by Article 4 of
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Perhaps more importantly, Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace is virtually
indistinguishable from Article 36(2) of the VCCR. Whereas Article 4 specifies that
creditors “shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value” of
debts, Article 36(2) specifies that U.S. “laws and regulations must enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended.”114
Both provisions, in essence, say that states parties cannot interpose domestic law as an
obstacle to prevent individuals whose rights are protected by the treaty from deriving the
full benefit of those rights. U.S. courts applying the Bork model have uniformly held that
Article 36(2) of the VCCR does not authorize judicial enforcement on behalf of private
individuals.115 Defenders of the Bork model cannot have it both ways. Their claim that
Article 36(2) does not authorize domestic judicial enforcement contradicts the argument
that Ware and the other Article 4 cases are consistent with the Bork model.
In light of these observations, consider again the Court’s statement in Ware that
the word “recovery” in Article 4 refers “to the right of action . . . and operates, in the
present case, to give remedy from the commencement of suit, to the receipt of the
money.”116 This statement, viewed in the proper historical context, manifests the Court’s
tacit assumption that “where there is a right, there is a remedy.”117 Article 4, by its terms,
creates a primary duty for debtors to pay, and a correlative primary right for creditors to
be paid.118 The Court inferred, on the basis of this primary rule, that creditors must have
a judicial remedy in cases where debtors refuse to pay their debts, because “where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”119 In
short, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies.
the peace treaty. Id. The tribunal ceased operations in 1798, but the United States and Great Britain
concluded a new treaty in 1802 “by which the United States agreed to pay the sum of 600,000 pounds in
satisfaction of claims for pre-war debts.” GOEBEL, supra, at 756.
Even after ratification of the 1802 treaty, the Supreme Court continued to enforce Article 4 of the
Definitive Treaty of Peace on behalf of British plaintiffs. Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II);
Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804). This fact is
directly relevant to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), one of the cases currently pending
before the Supreme Court. In Hamdan, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the POW Convention is not
judicially enforceable because the Convention provides international dispute resolution mechanisms. See
id. at 38-40. In the early nineteenth century, though, the Supreme Court continued to enforce Article 4 of
the peace treaty on behalf of British plaintiffs, even after the parties had created an international mechanism
designed specifically to resolve disputes related to Article 4. Thus, the logic of Hamdan is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s treatment of the British creditor cases.
114
VCCR, supra note 7, art. 36, para. 2.
115
See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-78 (Or. 2005) (applying the Bork model and
concluding on that basis “that the obligations that Article 36 describes are enforceable only by the affected
signatory states and not by individual detainees”).
116
Ware, 3 U.S. at 241.
117
This is a translation of the Latin maxim “ubi jus, ibi remedium.” See Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
ed. 1990).
118
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts
heretofore contracted”). A remedial rule, creating a private right of action, would have specified that if
debtors refuse to pay, creditors may bring suit to enforce their rights.
119
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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c. Other Cases That are Inconsistent with the Bork Model: During the period
under study, the Court decided five other cases that are inconsistent with the Borkian
presumption against judicial remedies for treaty violations.
In Chirac v. Chirac,120 the French heirs of John Baptiste Chirac brought an action
for ejectment to gain possession of real estate in Maryland. If the Court had applied
Maryland law, the land would have escheated to the state.121 In support of their action for
ejectment, the French heirs invoked Article 7 of the 1800 Convention with France, which
protected the rights of French subjects holding property in the United States.122 Neither
Article 7 nor any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiffs to
enforce the treaty in a domestic court. Regardless, Justice Marshall, writing for the court,
enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding that the treaty “does away the
incapacity of alienage, and places the defendants in error in precisely the same situation,
with respect to lands, as if they had become citizens.”123
In Carneal v. Banks,124 the plaintiff sued to rescind a land swap contract with
defendants. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants did not have a valid title to the
land they promised to transfer because their title was derived from Lacassaign, a French
national, whose alienage precluded him from conveying title to the property.125 In
response, defendants invoked Article 11 of the 1778 Treaty with France, which protects
the property rights of French subjects residing in the United States.126 Neither Article 11
nor any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the defendants to enforce
the treaty in a domestic court. Regardless, Justice Marshall, writing for the court, applied
the treaty on behalf of the defendants. The Court held that the “alienage of Lacassaign
constitutes no objection . . . [because] the treaty of 1778, between the United States and

120

15 U.S. 259 (1817).
Id. at 273-74.
122
1800 Convention with France, supra note 92, art. 7, (“The Citizens, and inhabitants of the United
States shall be at liberty to dispose by testament, donation, or otherwise, of their goods, moveable, and
immoveable, holden in the territory of the French Republic in Europe, and the Citizens of the French
Republic, shall have the same liberty with regard to goods, moveable, and immoveable, holden in the
territory of the United States, in favor of such persons as they shall think proper. The Citizens and
inhabitants of either of the two countries, who shall be heirs of goods, moveable, or immoveable in the
other shall be able to succeed ab intestato, without being obliged to obtain letters of naturalization, and
without having the effect of this provision contested or impeded under any pretext whatever.”)
123
Chirac, 15 U.S. at 275.
124
23 U.S. 181 (1825).
125
Id. at 182-86.
126
1778 Treaty with France, supra note 81, art. 11, at 11-12 (“The Subjects and Inhabitants of the
said United States . . . may by Testament, Donation, or otherwise dispose of their Goods moveable and
immoveable in favour of such Persons as to them shall seem good; and their Heirs, Subjects of the Said
United States, residing whether in France or elsewhere, may succeed them ab intestat, without being
obliged to obtain Letters of Naturalization, and without having the Effect of this Concession contested or
impeded under Pretext of any Rights or Prerogatives of Provinces, Cities, or Private Persons. . . . The
Subjects of the most Christian King shall enjoy on their Part, in all the Dominions of the said States, an
entire and perfect Reciprocity relative to the Stipulations contained in the present Article.”)
121
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France, secures to the citizens and subjects of either power the privilege of holding lands
in the territory of the other.”127
In Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven,128 a British
corporation brought an action for ejectment against the Town of New Haven. The
plaintiff owned the subject property before the Revolutionary War.129 After the War, the
Vermont legislature passed a law that expropriated the plaintiff and granted its property
rights in the state “to the respective towns in which such lands lay.”130 In support of its
suit for ejectment, plaintiff invoked Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, which
prohibited confiscation of British property in the United States.131 Neither Article 6 nor
any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiff to enforce the treaty
in a domestic court.132 Nevertheless, the Court enforced the treaty on behalf of the
plaintiff. Referring to the land grant from the Vermont legislature to the Town of New
Haven, the Court said: “[T]he only question is, whether this grant was not void by force
of the 6th article of the above treaty? We think it was.”133
In Carver v. Jackson,134 plaintiffs who traced their property claims to Roger
Morris brought an action for ejectment. The New York legislature had confiscated
Morris’ property during the Revolutionary War.135 After conclusion of the peace treaty
with Britain, New York passed laws requiring plaintiffs who sued to regain possession of
confiscated properties to pay the occupants of those properties for any improvements
made thereon.136 When plaintiffs sued for ejectment, defendant sought compensation for
improvements in accordance with New York law. In reply, plaintiffs contended that state
laws requiring them to pay compensation for improvements violated Article 6 of the
Definitive Treaty of Peace.137 Neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the treaty
specifically empowered the plaintiffs to enforce the treaty in a domestic court.138
127

Carneal, 23 U.S. at 189.
21 U.S. 464 (1823).
129
Id. at 465-66.
130
Id. at 466.
131
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 6, at 155 (“[T]here shall be no future Confiscations
made nor any Prosecutions commenc’d against any Person or Persons for or by Reason of the Part, which
he or they may have taken in the present War, and that no Person shall on that Account suffer any future
Loss or Damage, either in his Person Liberty or Property.”)
132
Article 5 of the treaty created a private right of action for British subjects whose land was
confiscated before entry into force of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. See supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text. Article 5 did not apply in this case, though, because the treaty took effect in 1783, and
the confiscation in this case did not occur until 1794. Thus, this case was governed by Article 6, which
addressed future confiscations. Article 6 did not create a private right of action.
133
Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel, 21 U.S. at 490-91.
134
29 U.S. 1 (1830).
135
Id. at 4.
136
Id. at 99-100.
137
Id. at 54, 65-66.
138
The Court’s opinion cites both Articles 5 and 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. See id. at 99101. Article 5 was retrospective, addressing confiscation of British property before entry into force of the
treaty; Article 6 was prospective, addressing future confiscations. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra
note 71. The point at issue in Carver was whether New York could enforce laws enacted in 1784 and
1786, after entry into force of the peace treaty, that would have required plaintiffs to pay for improvements
128
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding
“that the claim for improvements in this case, is inconsistent with the treaty of peace, and
ought to be rejected.”139
In Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co.,140 a British prize court condemned a
U.S. ship. The ship owner sued the insurance company for breach of contract because the
insurer refused to issue payment on the policy.141 The company claimed that the
judgment of the British court terminated its contractual obligation under the policy. The
Supreme Court, though, ruled in favor of the ship owner on the grounds that the capture
and condemnation of the ship violated article 18 of the Jay Treaty.142 Article 18 created a
duty for British naval vessels not to detain American ships.143 The treaty, however, did
not explicitly empower ship owners to bring suit in U.S. courts for violations of article
18. Nor was there any federal statute that authorized private enforcement of the treaty.
Nevertheless, the Court awarded a remedy to the individual plaintiff whose treaty rights
were violated.144
In all five cases, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights. In every case, the Court
enforced the treaty on behalf of the party invoking the treaty, even though there was no
statutory or treaty provision that expressly empowered individual litigants to enforce the
treaty. All five cases, therefore, are inconsistent with the Bork model. From the
standpoint of Justice Marshall and his contemporaries, though, the absence of an express
private right of action was not a bar to judicial enforcement because, in their view, every
treaty provision that protects individual rights empowers the right-holder to invoke the
treaty before a U.S. court.
4. Cases in Which It is Unclear Whether the Treaty Created a Private Right of
Action: The previous section analyzed cases where the Court enforced a treaty on behalf
of an individual litigant, despite the fact that there was no statutory or treaty provision
granting that individual a private cause of action. Those cases are patently inconsistent
with the Bork model. This section analyzes cases where the Court enforced a treaty on
behalf of an individual litigant, there was no statutory right of action, and it is debatable
whether the treaty at issue created a private right of action. If one construes the Borkian
requirement for a right of action strictly, insisting on express treaty language that
made by defendants. See Carver, 29 U.S. at 99-100. The Court held that state laws requiring plaintiffs to
pay for improvements constituted a “confiscation” of their estate, in violation of Article 6. Id. at 101.
Thus, although Article 5 created a private right of action for claims involving confiscation of property
before entry into force of the peace treaty, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text, that right of
action did not apply to the specific claim at issue in Carver.
139
Carver, 29 U.S. at 101.
140
8 US 185 (1808).
141
Id. at 197.
142
See Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 18, at 258-59.
143
Id., art. 18 (“And whereas it frequently happens that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to an
enemy, without knowing that the same is . . . blockaded . . . it is agreed that every vessel so circumstanced
may be turned away from such port or place, but she shall not be detained . . . . unless after notice she shall
again attempt to enter.”)
144
Fitzsimmons, 8 U.S. at 197-202.
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empowers individual litigants to enforce the treaty, then these cases are also inconsistent
with the Bork model. If one construes the right of action requirement less rigidly,
permitting implied rights of action in some cases, then these cases are arguably consistent
with the Bork model.
Before analyzing these cases, two points merit attention. First, in none of the
cases under consideration here did the Court specifically address, separate from the
merits of the case, the question whether the treaty created a private right of action. In the
jurisprudence of the early nineteenth century, the Court simply assumed that every
individual litigant whose treaty-based rights were violated had the power to enforce those
rights in a domestic court. Second, while it is possible to analyze these cases in a manner
that is consistent with the Bork model by construing the Borkian right of action
requirement liberally, that analysis is in tension with many of the modern cases applying
the Bork model, where courts have construed the right of action requirement quite
strictly.
During the period under study, the Supreme Court decided six cases in which it
awarded judgment to individual litigants whose rights were protected under Article 9 of
the Jay Treaty, including two cases where plaintiffs prevailed in their treaty-based
claims,145 and four cases where defendants won treaty-based defenses.146 In none of
these cases was there a federal statute empowering individual litigants to enforce Article
9 in a U.S. court. Thus, every case would have been decided differently under the Bork
model, unless the treaty itself creates a private right of action. Whether it does is a close
question.
Article 9 states as follows:
It is agreed, that British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of
the United States, and American Citizens who now hold Lands in the
Dominions of His Majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the
nature and Tenure of their respective Estates and Titles therein, and may
grant Sell or Devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if
145

Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489 (1824) (ordering foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property to
secure individual property right protected by article 9 of Jay Treaty); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. 594 (1818)
(ordering defendants to convey land to plaintiff because defendants had wrongfully appropriated land in
violation of article 9 of Jay Treaty).
146
Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830) (where plaintiffs brought equitable action, asserting
entitlement to defendants’ share of proceeds from sale of land, Court held that article 9 of Jay Treaty
protected defendants’ right to half of proceeds from sale); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. 453 (1819) (where
plaintiff sued to rescind contract for purchase of land, challenging validity of defendant’s title, Court
dismissed bill for rescission because defendant had valid title protected by article 6 of Definitive Treaty of
Peace and article 9 of Jay Treaty); Jackson v. Clarke, 16 U.S. 1 (1818) (where plaintiff sued for ejectment,
Court dismissed suit because article 9 of Jay Treaty protected rights of British citizens to hold and inherit
land); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1812) (where plaintiff sued for ejectment, Court
dismissed suit because defendant’s title to land was secured by article 9 of Jay Treaty). For additional
analysis of these cases, see GEORGE LEE HASKINS AND HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 554-57 (1981) (volume 2 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of
the Supreme Court of the United States).
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they were Natives; and that neither they nor their Heirs or assigns shall, so
far as may respect the said Lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto,
be regarded as Aliens.147
If the treaty drafters had not included the italicized phrase, Article 9 would clearly not
satisfy the Borkian requirement for a private cause of action. Advocates of the Bork
model could reasonably argue, though, that the decisions enforcing Article 9 on behalf of
individual litigants are consistent with the Bork model because the italicized phrase
empowers individual litigants to enforce Article 9 in a domestic court. In support of this
argument, they could cite the Supreme Court’s statement that “the remedies, as well as
the rights, of these aliens, are completely protected by the treaty of 1794.”148
On the other hand, the phrasing of article 9 suggests that the treaty drafters, like
the courts of that era, were working against the background assumption that “where there
is a right, there is a remedy.” That widely shared background assumption may explain
why the treaty drafters described the legal remedies as being “incident to” estates and
titles in land. Under this Marshallian view, the treaty itself protects titles in land (a
primary right), and the associated legal remedies are “incident to” those titles.
Assume, hypothetically, that the New York legislature passed a law abolishing the
traditional action for ejectment, and requiring individuals to petition the Governor,
instead of filing suit in court, whenever they wanted to assert claims to land occupied by
someone else. If the law applied equally to citizens and aliens, there would be no
violation of the Jay Treaty.149 Therefore, article 9 of the Jay Treaty does not actually
empower British citizens to enforce the treaty in U.S. courts – that is, it does not create a
private right of action. It merely prevents discrimination against British citizens who
hold title to property in the United States, ensuring that they have equal access to the
remedies that U.S. law provides for U.S. citizens. If this view is correct, then the six
147

Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 9 (emphasis added).
Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489, 496 (1824).
149
The Court’s decision in Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480
(1830), supports this point. The plaintiff was a British corporation that owned land in Vermont before the
Revolutionary War. See id. at 500-02. In 1794, many years after the war ended, the Vermont legislature
confiscated plaintiff’s property in Vermont. By operation of state law, the land at issue passed to the Town
of Pawlet, which then rented the subject property to Ozias Clarke, who retained possession and occupancy
until plaintiff sued for ejectment. Id. at 481-84. The Vermont law confiscating plaintiff’s property was a
clear violation of Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, and of Article 9 of the Jay Treaty. See
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 6 (prohibiting future confiscation of British property after
1783); Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 9 (protecting the rights of British nationals who held land in the
United States). Plaintiff sought two distinct remedies for the violation of its treaty rights: recovery of the
land, and collection of mesne profits. The traditional common law action for ejectment carried with it a
remedial right to recover mesne profits. See id. at 489, 508. Vermont, though, had enacted statutes that
superseded the common law and barred recovery of mesne profits by plaintiffs in ejectment actions. Id. at
509. Defendants, therefore, contested plaintiff’s claim for mesne profits. The Court ruled in favor of the
defendants on this point. Justice Story, writing for the Court, said that Vermont had “prescribed the
restrictions upon which mesne profits shall be recovered; and these restrictions are obligatory upon the
citizens of the state. The plaintiffs have not, in this particular, any privileges by treaty beyond those of
citizens.” Id. at 509-10. Since the law restricting mesne profits applied equally to citizens and aliens,
Vermont could apply the law to British plaintiffs without violating their treaty rights.
148
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cases in which the Supreme Court awarded individual remedies for violations of Article 9
are inconsistent with the Bork model.
B.
Cases Where the Court Did not Reach the Merits of a Treaty-Based
Claim or Defense
In United States v. Judge Lawrence,150 the Attorney General petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, invoking Article 9 of a consular treaty with
France,151 and seeking to compel the district judge to issue a warrant for extradition of an
alleged deserter.152 The Attorney General asserted that the district judge had violated the
treaty by refusing to issue a warrant.153 The Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits
of the government’s treaty claim, holding unanimously “that a mandamus ought not to
issue” because the judge had acted within the scope of his discretion.154 Judge Lawrence
is consistent with the Bork model because the party invoking the treaty did not obtain the
remedy sought.155 The case is also consistent with the Marshall model, though, because
the district court held that the United States did not have a duty to extradite the fugitive
(hence, France had no right to compel his extradition), and the Supreme Court did not
disturb that ruling.
In addition to Judge Lawrence, the Supreme Court decided six other treaty cases
between 1789 and 1838 in which it declined to reach the merits of a treaty-based claim or
defense. The Court dismissed three of those cases for lack of jurisdiction.156 In three
other cases, the Court concluded that it lacked sufficient information to decide the merits

150

3 U.S. 42 (1795).
Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice Consuls,
Nov. 14, 1788, art. 9, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States
of America 228, 237-38 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “Consular Convention”].
152
Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. at 42-44. Initially, the French Vice Consul filed suit in the district court,
seeking a warrant for extradition of Captain Barre. Id. at 42-43. The district judge refused to issue the
warrant on the grounds that the Vice Consul failed to provide the proof required by the treaty. See id. at
43-44. The case counts as a case in which an individual litigant raised a treaty-based claim because the
Vice Consul asserted, on behalf of France, a right to have the deserter extradited.
153
Id. at 48-53. Interestingly, in support of the government’s argument for a writ of mandamus, the
Attorney General stated: “The general principle of issuing that writ, is founded on the necessity of
affording a competent remedy for every right.” Id. at 52. Thus, in the late 18th century, even the Attorney
General apparently endorsed the Marshall model.
154
Id. at 53.
155
At the district court level, the French Vice Consul failed to obtain a warrant for extradition, which
was the remedy he sought. At the Supreme Court level, the Attorney General failed to obtain a writ of
mandamus, which was the remedy he sought.
156
Keene v. Clark’s Heirs, 35 U.S. 291 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed that he was evicted from land,
and that his title was protected by treaty, Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because state court had
decided case on the basis of state law); New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 236 (1835) (where
individual plaintiffs sued City of New Orleans, asserting title to property in the city, and City raised defense
based on Louisiana Treaty, Court held that “[t]he case involves no principle on which this court could take
jurisdiction”); Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344 (1809) (where defendant raised defense based on
article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, Court dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that case
did not “arise under” a treaty).
151

26

Judge Bork’s Anti-Originalist Revolution
David Sloss

March 2006

of the treaty claim.157 All seven cases in which the Court did not reach the merits of a
treaty-based claim or defense are consistent with the Bork model because, in each case,
the Court declined to enforce the treaty on behalf of an individual litigant. However,
none of these cases endorse the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of
treaties. In each case, the Court’s rationale for refusing to reach the merits is a rationale
that applies equally to constitutional, statutory and common law claims. In no case did
the Court decline to reach the merits because the treaty was not “judicially enforceable,”
or because the treaty did not create a private right of action. Thus, all seven cases in this
category are consistent with the Marshall model.
C.

Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Lost on the Merits

Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided 13 cases in which it ruled
that a treaty did not protect the right asserted by the individual invoking the treaty.158
157

Soulard v. U.S., 29 U.S. 511, 513 (1830) (where plaintiffs asserted rights to land in Missouri,
claiming title based on Spanish grants protected by the Louisiana Treaty, Court determined that it was
“unable to form a judment which would be satisfactory” and decided “to hold the cases . . . under
advisement”); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. 52 (1819) (where Spanish consul sought restoration of captured
vessel to Spanish shipowners, alleging that capture violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court remanded
case to circuit court for further proceedings); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. 300 (1816) (where British plaintiff
raised claim based on Article 9 of Jay Treaty, Court remanded case to circuit court for additional
factfinding).
158
See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838) (where plaintiff sued to eject defendant from land in
Louisiana, asserting rights under 1819 treaty whereby U.S. acquired Florida from Spain, Court held that
plaintiff had no rights under that treaty because U.S. had acquired subject land from France as part of
Louisiana purchase in 1803); U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838) (where plaintiff asserted title to land in
Florida protected by article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, Court held that he never acquired title from Spain
because he failed to perform condition precedent that was required in order to obtain title by virtue of
Spanish grant); U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838) (where plaintiff asserted title to land in Florida
protected by article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, Court rejected claim because he failed to perform condition
required by express terms of Spanish grant); Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed
title to land in Missouri protected by article 3 of Treaty for Cession of Louisiana, Court rejected claim
because Spanish “grant” merely gave him option to select land, and option expired because he failed to
exercise option before March 1804); Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480
(1830) (where British corporation asserted right to recover mesne profits for confiscated land, Court held
that neither the Jay Treaty nor the Definitive Treaty of Peace granted plaintiff right to recover mesne
profits); Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193 (1828) (where claims commission established by treaty awarded
payment to assignees from U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, bankrupt person sued assignees to recover funds,
and assignees invoked judgment of treaty-based claims commission as a defense, Court held that
Commission’s judgment did not bar suit because Commission’s authority under treaty extended only to
claims by U.S. citizens against Spain, but not to disputes between U.S. citizens); Blight’s Lessee v.
Rochester, 20 U.S. 535 (1822) (where plaintiffs asserted title to land in Kentucky by descent from James
Dunlap, a British subject, Court held that Dunlap’s title was not protected by either the Jay Treaty or the
Definitive Treaty of Peace, because he acquired title after the peace treaty took effect and died before
signature of the Jay Treaty); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821) (in a dispute between a U.S. captor
and a Spanish claimant who invoked article XVII of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, the Court ruled in favor of
the U.S. captor, holding that “the immunity . . . intended by that article [XVII] never took effect”); The
Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819) (ruling in favor of captor and rejecting claim of Spanish
ship owner, who invoked the 1795 Treaty with Spain, because the treaty did not protect the subject goods
from capture); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) (where American privateer captured enemy vessel with
neutral cargo, and asserted a right to seize the cargo under article 15 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court
held that the law of nations protects neutral cargo from capture, and the treaty did not alter the law of
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The results of all 13 cases are consistent with the Bork model because the party invoking
the treaty did not obtain a remedy. They are also consistent, however, with the
Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies. That presumption applies only in
cases where an individual establishes that his or her treaty rights have been violated. In
each of these 13 cases, the presumption did not apply because the Court decided that the
treaty did not protect the right asserted by the individual invoking the treaty.
It bears emphasis that none of the 13 cases cited above endorse the Borkian
presumption against private enforcement of treaties. None of the cases denied relief on
the grounds that the treaty at issue did not create a private right of action.159 Moreover,
none of the cases denied relief on the grounds that the treaty at issue was not judicially
enforceable. Indeed, all 13 cases involved treaties that the Court did enforce on behalf of
individual litigants in other cases.160 Therefore, these 13 cases provide no support for the

nations in that respect); Smith v. State of Maryland, 10 U.S. 286 (1810) (where defendant held land in trust
for British subject that Maryland confiscated in 1780, Court held that confiscation did not violate Article 6
of the Definitive Treaty of Peace because Maryland confiscated the land before the treaty took effect);
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. 285 (1796) (where French captors of Dutch ship invoked article 17 of the 1778
Treaty with France as a bar to jurisdiction of U.S. courts, Court rejected treaty-based jurisdictional
argument but ruled in favor of French captors on the merits); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16
(1794) (where French privateer contended that article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France barred the district
court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a prize case, Court ruled that the treaty did not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction, and instructed the court to decide whether “restitution can be made consistently with the laws
of nations and the treaties and laws of the United States”).
159
In two of the cases, the party invoking the treaty had an express private right of action under
article 20 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821); The Nuestra Senora
de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819). See also supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing other
cases involving article 20 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain). In three of the cases, the party invoking the
treaty had an express private right of action under federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida or Missouri.
See U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838) (land in Florida); U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838) (land
in Florida); Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836) (land in Missouri). See also supra notes 57-67 and
accompanying text (discussing federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida and Missouri).
160
Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836), involved Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty, which the Court
enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in three other cases. See supra note 62 and accompanying text
(discussing those three cases). Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838), U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838),
and U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838), all involved Article 8 of the Florida Treaty, which the Court
enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in nine other cases. See supra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing those nine cases). Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193 (1828), involved Articles 9 and 11 of the
Florida Treaty. The Court did not decide any other cases during this period implicating those specific
treaty provisions.
Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 (1830), Blight’s Lessee v.
Rochester, 20 U.S. 535 (1822), and Smith v. State of Maryland, 10 U.S. 286 (1810) all involved Article 9 of
the Jay Treaty, or Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, or both. The Court enforced Article 9 of the
Jay Treaty on behalf of individual litigants in six other cases during this period. See supra notes 145-49
and accompanying text. The Court enforced Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace on behalf of
individual litigants in two other cases. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821), The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819),
and The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) all involved the 1795 Treaty with Spain. The Court enforced that
treaty on behalf of individual litigants in two other cases: The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. 152 (1821), and The
Pizarro, 15 U.S. 227 (1817). Both The Nereide (where the party invoking the treaty lost) and The Pizarro
(where the party invoking the treaty won) involved article 15 of that treaty. The Nuestra Senora de la
Caridad does not say which specific article is implicated. The Amiable Isabella involved article 17 of the
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Bork model. In fact, these cases tend to support the Marshall model, because the Court
generally applied a Marshallian “rights-focused methodology,” not a Borkian “remediesfocused” methodology.
In addition to the 13 cases cited above, the Supreme Court decided three other
cases during this period in which the party invoking the treaty lost on the merits of a
treaty-based claim or defense: Strother v. Lucas,161 De la Croix v. Chamberlain,162 and
Foster v. Neilson.163 These three cases illustrate limits to the Marshallian principle that
“where there is a right, there is a remedy.” The remainder of this section analyzes
Strother and De la Croix. Section D below addresses Foster.
Both Strother and De la Croix were ejectment actions. In both cases, the plaintiff
claimed title to land as the successor to a person who acquired an interest in the subject
property when the territory was under Spanish control.164 In both cases, the plaintiff’s
property rights were protected by treaty: Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty in Strother;165
and Article 8 of the Florida Treaty in De la Croix.166 Congress had enacted a series of
statutes creating boards of commissioners with authority to entertain claims by
individuals who asserted property rights protected by the Louisiana or Florida Treaty.
The statutes directed individuals to present their claims to the relevant board, and granted
the boards authority to confirm titles to land in territory subject to their respective
jurisdictions.167 In De la Croix, the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest failed to
present a claim to the relevant board of commissioners;168 in Strother, plaintiff’s
predecessor failed to do so in a timely fashion.169 In each case, the plaintiff’s failure to

treaty. The Court did not decide any other cases during this period implicating that specific treaty
provision.
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. 285 (1796) and Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 (1794) both
involved article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France. The Court enforced other provisions of the same treaty
on behalf of individual litigants in Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. 319 (1796) and Carneal v.
Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825). See supra notes 80-83 and 124-27 and accompanying text. There were no
Supreme Court cases during this period where the Court enforced article 17 on behalf of individual
litigants. There were, however, decisions by lower federal courts enforcing article 17. See, e.g., Moodie v.
The Amity, 17 F.Cas. 650 (D.S.C. (1796) (holding that article 17 of 1778 Treaty with France precluded
district court from exercising jurisdiction in prize case where French vessel captured ship outside the
jurisdictional limits of the United States).
161
37 U.S. 410 (1838).
162
25 U.S. 599 (1827).
163
27 U.S. 253 (1829).
164
See Strother, 37 U.S. at 430-32; De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 599-600.
165
See Strother, 37 U.S. at 435-40. See also Louisiana Treaty, supra note 57, art. 3.
166
See De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02. See also Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8.
167
See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
168
See De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02 (“It does not appear that this order of survey has ever been
recorded or passed upon by the board of commissioners, or register of the land office, established by
Congress in the district in which the land lies.”).
169
See Strother, 37 U.S. at 453-54. In Strother, the plaintiff’s predecessor did file a claim with the
recorder of land titles in 1815. See id. However, defendant’s predecessor had filed a claim with the board
of commissioners in 1806, which the board had confirmed in 1809-10. Id. at 433. Plaintiff’s predecessor,
therefore, filed her claim several years too late.

29

Judge Bork’s Anti-Originalist Revolution
David Sloss

March 2006

present his claim to the relevant board of commissioners was a key element of the
Court’s rationale for awarding judgment to the defendant.170
Therefore, Strother and De la Croix signify that in cases where Congress has
established a domestic remedial mechanism enabling individuals to enforce their treatybased rights, individuals who fail to utilize the congressionally established mechanism
may ultimately lose the ability to enforce their rights. Both cases are consistent with the
Marshall model because the Marshall model recognizes that Congress has the power to
enact legislation that restricts the availability of domestic judicial remedies for
individuals who have treaty-protected rights. Both cases are also consistent with the
Bork model, inasmuch as the Court denied remedies in both cases for plaintiffs whose
rights were protected by treaties. Neither case, however, endorses the Borkian
presumption against private enforcement of treaties. In neither case did the Court deny
relief on the grounds that the treaty at issue did not create a private right of action, or on
the grounds that the treaty was not judicially enforceable.
D.

Foster and Its Progeny

In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork cited Foster v. Neilson171 for
the proposition that treaties “do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable
in courts.”172 In recent cases involving both the VCCR and the POW Convention, state
courts and lower federal courts have also cited Foster for similar propositions.173
Indeed, virtually every modern case that endorses the Borkian presumption against
judicial enforcement of treaties cites Foster as authority, or cites some other case that
cites Foster as authority. In particular, the modern cases cite that portion of the Foster
opinion that has come to be associated with the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.174
But insofar as the Bork model relies on Foster’s non-self-execution holding,175 it is a

170

See id. at 453-54; De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
172
726 F.2d 774, 808 (Bork, J., concurring).
173
See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (in a case raising claims
under the POW Convention, citing Foster as authority for the proposition that “[t]reaties do not generally
create rights privately enforceable in the courts”); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2000) (in
a case raising claims under the VCCR, citing Foster as authority for the proposition that “treaties do not
generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts”).
174
The so-called doctrine of non-self-executing treaties is actually four distinct doctrines. See Sloss,
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 12-18 (2002) (summarizing four doctrines). See also Carlos
M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695 (1995) (presenting a
different four-fold classification). The two versions of the doctrine that emerged in the twentieth century
are radically different, in important respects, from the two nineteenth century versions of the doctrine. See
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, at 12-18. Thus, the “non-self-execution” portion of Foster bears very
little relationship to the modern doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.
175
Foster never used the terms “self-executing” or “non-self-executing.” Justice Marshall’s
contemporaries used the terms “executory” and “executed” to describe what is now commonly referred to
as Foster’s non-self-execution holding. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 746-47
(1838). It was not until 1887, in the case of Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887), that the Court
first used the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” to describe Foster‘s distinction between
executory and executed treaty provisions. Nevertheless, in accordance with modern terminology, this
171
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model erected on a foundation of sand. This is true for three reasons. First, the non-selfexecution portion of Foster is properly viewed as a concurring opinion, because the
majority in Foster would have decided the case on other grounds.176 Second, the Court
overruled the non-self-execution portion of Foster four years after it decided the case.177
Third, Foster says nothing about private rights of action, and it did not endorse a
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.
This section demonstrates that Foster provides no support for the Bork model.
The analysis is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section provides historical
background. Next, the article discusses the “political question” holding in Foster. Then,
the article addresses the territorial application of Article 8 of the Florida Treaty. The last
two sub-sections examine the “non-self-execution” holding in Foster, and address the
relationship between Foster and the Bork model.
1. Historical Background: The land at issue in Foster is situated within an area
that is bounded on the North by the 31st parallel, on the West by the Mississippi River
and on the East by the Perdido River.178 In terms of contemporary geography, this area
includes the southernmost portions of Alabama and Mississippi, and parts of southeastern
Louisiana (not including New Orleans). This article will refer to the area as “Floriana.”
In the early nineteenth century, there was a dispute between the United States and Spain
as to whether Floriana was part of Florida, which Spain owned at that time, or Louisiana,
which the United States owned.
As of 1760, Louisiana was French territory and Florida was Spanish territory.
The Perdido River was the accepted boundary between Louisiana and Florida.179
Floriana, therefore, was part of Louisiana. In 1763, Great Britain, France and Spain
signed the treaty of Paris. By that treaty, Great Britain acquired Florida from Spain.
Great Britain also acquired from France that portion of Louisiana that lay east of the
Mississippi River, except for New Orleans and the island on which it is situated.180 In a
separate, secret treaty concluded at about the same time, France ceded the residue of
Louisiana to Spain.181 The King of England then divided his newly acquired territory
into two provinces, which were labeled East and West Florida. By a royal proclamation
issued in 1763, he established the 31st parallel as the northern border of the two
Floridas.182 At that time, Floriana became part of West Florida.
article will use the term “non-self-execution” to refer to the relevant portion of Marshall’s opinion in
Foster.
176
See infra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.
177
See U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 88-89 (1833) (expressly overruling Foster’s non-selfexecution holding). See also U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832) (overruling Foster sub silentio).
178
The Perdido River currently forms the western boundary of Florida that separates the Florida
panhandle from Alabama.
179
Foster, 27 U.S. at 300.
180
Id. at 300-01.
181
Id.
182
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. 523, 524 (1827). The 31st parallel now forms the border between the
Florida panhandle and that portion of Southern Alabama that lies east of the Perdido River. The 31st
parallel also forms part of the border between Mississippi and Louisiana.

31

Judge Bork’s Anti-Originalist Revolution
David Sloss

March 2006

The United States declared its independence from Britain in 1776. During the
Revolutionary War, Spain conquered Florida, reclaiming the land from Britain.183 In
September 1783, Great Britain signed peace treaties with both the United States and
Spain. In the treaty with Spain, Britain ceded East and West Florida (including Floriana)
to Spain,184 but that treaty did not specify the boundaries of Florida. The treaty between
Britain and the United States established the Mississippi River as the western boundary
of the United States, and the 31st parallel as the southern boundary separating the U.S.
from Florida.185 Neither treaty established a boundary between Louisiana and Florida,
but the issue was unimportant at that time because Spain owned both territories, having
acquired Louisiana from France in 1763 and Florida from Britain in 1783.
In 1800, France and Spain concluded the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, in which Spain
agreed “to retrocede to the French republic . . . the colony or province of Louisiana, with
the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France
possessed it.”186 This language was deeply ambiguous. The province of Louisiana
“when France possessed it,” prior to 1763, included Floriana – i.e., the land east of the
Mississippi, west of the Perdido, and south of the 31st parallel. But Britain had
incorporated Floriana into Florida in 1763, and Spain had acquired Floriana (along with
the rest of Florida) from Britain in 1783. Thus, Spain insisted that when it ceded
Louisiana to France “with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain,” Floriana
was not included as part of Louisiana.187
In the Louisiana Purchase agreement concluded in 1803, the United States
acquired Louisiana from France. That treaty, however, merely referred back to the
Treaty of St. Ildefonso to define the boundaries of Louisiana.188 Beginning in 1803,
Congress passed a series of acts to establish U.S. control over Louisiana. Congressional
actions left no doubt that Congress believed the U.S. had acquired Floriana from France
as part of the Louisiana Purchase.189 Congress, therefore, asserted U.S. sovereignty over
Floriana. Meanwhile, though, Spain continued to assert Spanish sovereignty over
Floriana, claiming the territory as part of Florida. The United States and Spain did not
finally resolve this political dispute until Spain ceded Florida to the United States in the
Florida Treaty in 1819.190 In the interim, though, between 1803 and 1819, Spain had
granted land in Floriana to various Spanish grantees.
2. The “Political Question” Holding in Foster: Foster involved a dispute over
title to land east of the Mississippi River, and south of the 31st parallel, in what is now
southeastern Louisiana. The plaintiffs traced their title to an 1804 land grant from the
Spanish governor of Florida.191 In response to their petition, defendant alleged that, prior
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Henderson v. Poindexter’s Lessee, 25 U.S. 530, 534 (1827).
Foster, 27 U.S. at 301.
See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 2.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 301 (quoting Treaty of St. Ildefonso).
See id. at 302-03.
See Louisiana Treaty, supra note 57, art. I.
See Foster, 27 U.S. at 303-09.
See Florida Treaty, supra note 63, arts. 2 and 3.
See Foster, at 253-55.
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to the 1804 grant, the land had been “ceded by Spain to France, and by France to the
United States; and the officer making said grant had not then and there any right [to grant
the land], and the said grant is wholly null and void.”192 Thus, the first question
presented in Foster was whether the 1804 Spanish land grant was valid. The resolution
of that question, in turn, hinged on the issue whether the U.S. had acquired the land from
France in 1803 as part of the Louisiana purchase: the very issue that had been the subject
of a political dispute between the U.S. and Spain from 1803 to 1819.
The Court noted that the language of the relevant treaties – the Louisiana Treaty
and the Treaty of St. Ildefonso – could plausibly be interpreted to support either the
Spanish position (that the land at issue was part of Spanish Florida in 1804), or the U.S.
position (that it was part of the United States in 1804).193 In this context, Marshall stated:
In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary, it is
scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by the
measures adopted by its own government. There being no common
tribunal to decide between them, each determines for itself on its own
rights, and if they cannot adjust their differences peaceably, the right
remains with the strongest. The judiciary is not that department of the
government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers
is confided . . . it is the province of the Court to conform its decisions to
the will of the legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed.194
In short, the Court’s initial holding in Foster was “that the question of boundary
between the United States and Spain, was a question for the political departments of the
government.”195
Since Congress had enacted numerous statutes asserting U.S.
sovereignty over Floriana,196 the Court accepted the U.S. view that the United States had
acquired the subject property when it purchased Louisiana in 1803.197 This meant that
the plaintiffs could not establish a valid title on the basis of the 1804 Spanish grant,
because the Spanish governor had no authority to grant land in U.S. territory.
The Court did not decide another case involving land in Floriana until it decided
Garcia v. Lee in 1838,198 nine years after its decision in Foster.199 By that time, Roger
Taney was Chief Justice, Marshall having died in the interim. In Garcia, Taney
reaffirmed Foster’s political question holding, stating “that the boundary line determined
192

Id. at 255.
Id. at 306-07.
194
Id. at 307.
195
Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511, 516 (1838) (restating the holding of Foster). See also Delacroix v.
Chamberlain, 25 U.S. 599, 600 (1827) (foreshadowing Foster’s political question holding in the following
terms: “A question of disputed boundary between two sovereign independent nations is, indeed, much more
properly a subject for diplomatic discussion . . . than of judicial investigation.”).
196
See Foster, 27 U.S., at 303-09.
197
Id. at 307-09.
198
37 U.S. 511 (1838).
199
Keene v. Clark’s Heirs, 35 U.S. 291 (1836), involved land in Floriana, but the Court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
193
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on as the true one by the political departments of the government, must be recognised as
the true one by the judicial department.”200 Indeed, Taney characterized this holding as
the “leading principle” of the Court’s decision in Foster. Clearly, Foster’s “leading
principle” has no application to modern treaty cases, because the principle, in Marshall’s
own words, applies only to cases involving “a controversy between two nations
concerning national boundary.”201 In State v. Sanchez-Llamas, though, one of the cases
now pending before the Supreme Court, the Oregon Supreme Court cited Foster’s
political question holding in support of its view that the VCCR is not judicially
enforceable.202 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court conflated the distinction between
Foster’s political question holding, which applies only to disputes concerning national
boundaries, and Foster’s non-self-execution holding, which has potentially broader
application.
3. The Territorial Application of Article 8: Having held that the plaintiffs could
not establish a valid title on the basis of the 1804 Spanish land grant, the Court in Foster
next considered whether the plaintiffs could establish a valid title on the basis of article 8
of the Florida Treaty.203 In Article 8, the U.S. promised to honor “[a]ll the grants of land
made before the 24th of January 1818 by [Spain] . . . in the said Territories ceded by His
Majesty to the United States.”204 This phraseology left open the question whether
Floriana was part of the territory “ceded by His Majesty to the United States,” within the
meaning of Article 8. The Justices disagreed among themselves on that question.
Marshall and one other Justice thought that the United States had a duty under Article 8
to protect the interests of individuals, such as the Foster plaintiffs, who received Spanish
land grants in Floriana before January 1818.205 Marshall conceded, though, that “[t]he
majority of the Court . . . think differently.”206 The majority view was that the U.S. duty
under Article 8 to protect the property rights of Spanish grantees applied only to grantees
of land in Florida proper, not to grantees of land in Floriana.207
If Marshall had concurred with the majority view that Article 8 did not apply to
land in Floriana, it would never have been necessary for the Foster court to decide
whether Article 8 was self-executing. The Court could have resolved the case on the
grounds that: 1) the plaintiffs’ grant from Spain was void ab initio (the Court’s
unanimous “political question” holding); and 2) plaintiffs had no rights under the treaty
because Article 8 did not apply to the land at issue (the majority view on the territorial
application question). Indeed, the Court decided Garcia v. Lee,208 the next case involving

200

Garcia, 37 U.S. at 520.
Foster, at 307.
202
See Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005).
203
See Foster, 27 U.S., at 310-14.
204
Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8.
205
See Foster, 27 U.S. at 312-13 (stating that “[o]ne other judge and myself are inclined to adopt” the
view that Article 8 applied to the Spanish grants in Floriana).
206
Id. at 313.
207
See id. at 310-14.
208
37 U.S. 511 (1838).
201

34

Judge Bork’s Anti-Originalist Revolution
David Sloss

March 2006

land in Floriana, on precisely these grounds. Moreover, Chief Justice Taney, writing for
the majority in Garcia, stated that the Court had decided Foster on these grounds!209
Thus, from the perspective of Chief Justice Taney, writing nine years after Foster,
Marshall’s discussion of non-self-execution in Foster was pure dicta, unrelated to the
central holdings of the case. In a very important sense, Taney was right. If the Foster
Court had followed modern practice, wherein different justices write separate opinions, a
different judge would have written the majority opinion, holding that Article 8 did not
apply to land in Floriana, and Marshall would have written a separate concurrence setting
forth his view that Article 8 was executory (not self-executing). But Marshall exercised
tight discipline over “his” court, so judges rarely wrote separate opinions in the Marshall
era.210 Thus, Marshall’s opinion for the Court presented the majority view,211 and then
presented his alternative non-self-execution rationale that yielded the same result.212
Modern scholars have failed to recognize that the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties
has been constructed on the basis of a portion of Marshall’s opinion that was an
alternative rationale supporting a conclusion that the majority reached on other grounds.
Worse yet, as the next section shows, modern cases relying on Foster have misinterpreted
Marshall’s rationale, and have discounted the fact that the Court itself rejected that
rationale four years after it decided Foster.
4. The “Non-self-execution” Holding in Foster: Since Marshall disagreed with
the majority about the territorial application of Article 8, he had two choices. He could
dissent from the majority view, or he could devise an alternative rationale supporting the
majority’s conclusion that Article 8 did not grant plaintiffs title to the disputed property.
Marshall chose the latter course.
Marshall’s rationale relied on the distinction between “executory” and “executed”
treaty provisions. In the terminology that was widely used in the early nineteenth century,
an executory contract promised future performance, whereas an executed contract

209

See id. at 520-21 (“[T]he case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, decides this case. It decides that the
territory in which this land was situated, belonged to the United States at the time that this grant was made
by the Spanish authority; it decides that this grant is not embraced by the eighth article of the treaty, which
ceded the Floridas to the United States; that the stipulations in that article are confined to the territory
which belonged to Spain at the time of the cession, according to the American construction of the treaty”)
(emphasis added).
210
See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 184 (1988)
(volumes 3 and 4 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States)
(“Throughout most of Marshall’s tenure, the Court had a remarkable percentage of unanimous or near
unanimous decisions . . . . For example, between 1816 and 1823, a period in which the Court’s
composition was unchanged, the Justices produced a total of 302 majority opinions. In all these cases, only
twenty-four dissents and eight concurrences were recorded.”)
211
See Foster, 27 U.S. at 310-13.
212
The result was that plaintiffs lost because they failed to establish valid title, either on the basis of
the Spanish grant, or on the basis of Article 8. Marshall agreed with the majority that Article 8 did not
grant plaintiffs a complete title to the land at issue, but he agreed for different reasons. The majority
thought that the subject property was not within the geographical scope of Article 8. Marshall thought that
Article 8 was executory.
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promised immediate performance.213 Marshall applied this distinction to Article 8 of the
Florida treaty, which said: “All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818
by His Catholic Majesty or by his lawful authorities . . . shall be ratified and confirmed to
the persons in possession of the lands . . . .”214 Marshall noted that the article “does not
say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have
acted directly on the subject, and would have repealed those acts of congress which were
repugnant to it.”215 In short, if Article 8 said that the grants “are hereby confirmed,” it
would have been an executed treaty provision that granted vested property rights to the
Spanish grantees. Since the treaty used the language “shall be ratified and confirmed,”
however, it was merely executory -- a promise of future action that required legislative
implementation before the Spanish grantees could obtain vested property rights.216
The term “vested” rights is important here. In Marbury v. Madison, Justice
Marshall devoted a considerable portion of his opinion to establishing the proposition that
Mr. Marbury’s appointment was not revocable, and that the law creating the office
granted him “vested” legal rights.217 Marshall then famously declared: “The government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.”218 Thus, in Marshall’s view, the violation of a
vested legal right requires a remedy, but the violation of a non-vested right does not
necessarily require a remedy. Under Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale, Article 8 of
the treaty granted the plaintiffs an inchoate title in the subject property, but it did not

213

See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 443 (explaining the difference between executory
and executed contracts). Justice Marshall had previously relied on the distinction between executory and
executed contracts in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136-37 (1810). Justice Iredell applied this terminology
to treaty provisions in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 271-72 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part). Marshall
did not use the terms “executed” and “executory” in Foster, but his contemporaries understood that
Marshall was drawing a distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions in Foster. See Sloss,
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 19-24.
214
Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8 (emphasis added).
215
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
216
Other commentators have generally understood Foster’s distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties to turn on the question whether the treaty has domestic legal effect in the
absence of implementing legislation. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 198-200 (2d ed. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 767
(1988); Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 174, at 700-02. This interpretation does not conform to the
19th century understanding of Foster. See Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 19-24.
217
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 154-62.
218
Id. at 163.
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grant them vested legal rights.219 Moreover, until Congress enacted legislation to execute
the treaty by granting them vested rights, the judiciary could not provide a remedy.220
Four years after Foster, in the case of United States v. Percheman,221 Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, reversed his decision in Foster, and concluded
that Article 8 of the Florida treaty was executed, not executory.222 In contrast to Foster,
the land at issue in Percheman was clearly within the territorial scope of Article 8,
because it was located in East Florida, in an area that was subject to undisputed Spanish
sovereignty before the 1819 treaty. Moreover, since the plaintiff claimed on the basis of
a Spanish grant issued in December 1815, there was no question that Spain had the
authority to issue the grant. The grant conveyed to Percheman “two thousand acres of
land . . . in absolute property.”223 Under principles of international law that were
generally accepted at that time, when territory passed by treaty from one sovereign to
another, “[t]he king cedes that only which belonged to him; lands he had previously
granted, were not his to cede.”224 Thus, even if the parties had not included Article 8 in
the treaty, Percheman’s property rights “would have been unaffected by the change” in
sovereigns.225 Therefore, it was apparent to Marshall and the other justices that his
previous interpretation of Article 8, as applied to property in Florida (east of the Perdido)
was untenable, because it would have had the effect of divesting landowners of their
vested property rights.226 Accordingly, Marshall reinterpreted the phrase “shall be
ratified and confirmed” in the text of Article 8 to mean that the property rights of the
grantees of Spanish land grants were “ratified and confirmed by the force of the
instrument itself,” that is, by the force of the treaty.227 In short, the treaty language was

219

Marshall did not use these terms in Foster, but this is the necessary implication of what he did say.
As noted above, Marshall believed that the land at issue was within the territorial scope of Article 8. This
meant that the United States had a duty under Article 8 to “ratify and confirm” the prior Spanish land grant.
That duty necessarily gave the grantees certain correlative rights. Since the grant itself was void, though,
the plaintiffs had no rights by virtue of the grant. Moreover, in accordance with nineteenth century
conceptions of property rights, it would have been unthinkable for a treaty -- or any other legal document
for that matter -- to grant unnamed individuals vested property rights in unspecified land. Therefore,
Marshall must have thought that the treaty granted the plaintiffs some type of inchoate property right that
required legislative action to be perfected into a complete title.
220
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 (“But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract . . . the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”)
221
32 U.S. 51 (1833).
222
See id. at 88-89.
223
Id. at 82-83.
224
Id. at 87.
225
Id. at 87.
226
Percheman had vested property rights before the treaty because the land was granted to him in
“abolute property.” Under Marshall’s interpretation of Article 8 in Foster, though, the treaty would have
converted Percheman’s absolute title into an inchoate property interest that could not be perfected without
congressional action. This would have been contrary to natural law principles that were widely accepted at
the time, and might even have been viewed as an unconstitutional taking.
227
Id. at 89. Other commentators have noted that Marshall relied on the Spanish text of the treaty to
support his reinterpretation of Article 8. While that explanation is true, it is incomplete. Marshall also
relied heavily on the fact that his previous interpretation of Article 8, if applied to land in Florida, would be
contrary to principles of natural law embodied in the law of nations. See id. at 86-87 (“The modern usage
of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is
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executed, the rights of Spanish grantees were fully vested, and those rights were
enforceable in the courts.228
Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale in Foster established an exception to the
general principle that there is a remedy for every violation of a right: the principle applies
only to vested rights. If a treaty provision is executory, then individuals cannot obtain
judicial remedies for violations of that treaty provision until the provision is executed and
their rights have vested. The fact that Marshall himself overruled Foster only four years
after the case was decided suggests that courts should be cautious in applying this
exception to the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies for violations of
individual treaty rights. If applied cautiously, the Foster exception is generally consistent
with the fundamental Marshallian presumption. The Supreme Court has been extremely
cautious in applying the Foster exception. In more than 175 years since Marshall’s
decision in Foster, the Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties to deny a remedy to an individual whose treaty rights were violated.229
Unfortunately, in recent years, state courts and lower federal courts have expanded the
Foster exception to the point where it threatens to swallow the underlying principle.
5. Foster and the Bork Model: Contrary to claims advanced by advocates of the
Bork model, Foster’s non-self-execution rationale says nothing about private rights of
action, nor does it establish a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. If
modern courts wish to adhere faithfully to Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale, then
they must examine the relevant treaty language to determine whether it promises
immediate performance (executed) or future performance (executory). Marshall’s
opinion in Foster does not support a presumption that treaties are generally executory.
Borkians may cite the following passage from Foster in defense of their view that
Foster supports a presumption against self-execution: “A treaty is in its nature a contract
between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object
to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.”230 This
passage, one could argue, shows that Marshall endorsed the broader principle that treaties
generally must be “carried into execution by the sovereign power” in order to effect “the
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be
generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.”)
228
Modern courts following the Bork model frequently cite Foster, and then include a parenthetical
comment noting that Percheman overruled Foster “on other grounds.” See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). This form of citation is very
misleading. Percheman specifically overruled Foster’s holding that Article 8 was executory.
229
Only once since Foster has the Supreme Court held that a treaty was not self-executing, and that
was an alternative holding. See Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1913).
The main holding was that the Treaty of Brussels did not apply to the patent at issue, and therefore did not
grant plaintiff the patent rights it asserted. See id. at 44-47. More recently, the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not self-executing, but the plaintiff in
that case did not assert rights under the treaty. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2763, 2767
(2004). For a brief survey of Supreme Court decisions involving self-execution, see Sloss, Non-SelfExecuting Treaties, supra note 34, at 71-73.
230
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
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object to be accomplished.”231 This argument, though, ignores the sentences immediately
after the quoted language: “In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision.”232 Thus, as others have noted, if one reads
the entire passage, rather than quoting selected portions of it, it is evident that Marshall’s
statement that treaties do not effect “the object to be accomplished” is a statement about
treaties in other countries, not treaties in the United States.233 In Marshall’s view, the
U.S. constitution establishes “a different principle:” the principle that treaties are “to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature.”234
The further qualification – that this principle applies whenever a treaty “operates
of itself” – makes clear that the principle applies only to executed treaty provisions. But
this qualification does not establish a presumption that treaties are generally executory.
To the contrary, the fact that Percheman overruled Foster, and the fact that the Supreme
Court has never again applied the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties to deny a
remedy to an individual whose treaty rights were violated, supports the opposite
presumption: that treaties are generally executed (meaning that treaty obligations are to
be performed immediately upon entry into force of the treaty) unless the treaty language
makes it abundantly clear that the drafters intended a particular obligation to be executory
(meaning that they did not expect the obligation to be performed until some time in the
future, after entry into force of the treaty).
*****
The conflict between the Bork model and the Marshall model centers around the
question whether courts have the authority to enforce treaties on behalf of private
individuals in the absence of express authorization by the political branches. Between
1789 and 1838, there were at least 13 cases, and arguably as many as 19 cases, in which
the Supreme Court enforced treaties on behalf of private individuals without express
authorization from the political branches. These Supreme Court decisions demonstrate
that the Court believed that express authorization was not necessary. In short, the cases
demonstrate that the Court understood the role of the judiciary in treaty enforcement in
accordance with the Marshall model, not the Bork model.
Other decisions by the Supreme Court during this period reinforce this
conclusion. The Court decided 57 cases during this period in which an individual litigant
raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty. In these 57 cases, the Court never said
that treaties are not judicially enforceable unless the treaty itself, or a federal statute,
231

See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 15, at 2087-89 (making a similar argument).
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
233
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2192-94 (1999)
(developing this argument in greater detail).
234
The Constitution states explicitly that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by both treaties
and statutes. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers of our Constitution believed that the principle
that treaties are “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature” was
sufficiently important that they included that principle in the text of the Constitution.
232
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creates a private right of action. In these 57 cases, the Court never endorsed a
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. In fact, several Supreme Court
decisions during this period contain language that appears to endorse a presumption in
favor of judicial enforcement of treaties.235 Moreover, all 57 cases are consistent with the
Marshall model. Although Strother, De la Croix and Foster show that there are
limitations on the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial enforcement, those cases
are consistent with the Marshall model because they support, at most, narrow exceptions
to the general principle that individuals are entitled to judicial remedies for violations of
their treaty-based individual rights.
III.
The Origins of the Bork Model
Judge Bork set forth the core elements of the Bork model in a single paragraph in
his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.236 That paragraph advances
two main propositions. First, there is a presumption against private enforcement of
treaties in U.S. courts. Second, to overcome that presumption, an individual litigant who
wishes to enforce a treaty must show either that there is legislation authorizing private
enforcement, or that the treaty itself creates a private right of action.237 Judge Bork cites
various authorities for each of these propositions. Thus, one can trace the origins of the
Bork model by examining the authorities he cites.
A.

The Presumption Against Judicial Enforcement

Judge Bork cites only one Supreme Court decision, Foster v. Neilson, in support
of his claim that there is a presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S.
courts.
For the reasons discussed above, Foster does not support any such
presumption.238 Bork also cites two other federal appellate opinions in support of the
asserted presumption: Canadian Transport Co. v. United States,239 and Dreyfus v. Von
Finck.240 In fact, neither case endorses a presumption against private enforcement of
treaties in U.S. courts. Thus, Judge Bork invented the Borkian presumption against
judicial enforcement of treaties in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren.
In Dreyfus v. Von Finck, a Jewish plaintiff who lived in Germany before World
War II brought suit against West German citizens, seeking recovery for wrongful
235

See, e.g., supra note 4 (quoting Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809)); text at note
99 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1801)); notes 118-21 and
accompanying text (analyzing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)); and note 155 (quoting United States v.
Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42 (1795)).
236
726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring).
237
See id. Judge Bork did not use the word “presumption” in Tel-Oren. He said that treaties “do not
generally create rights that are privately enforceable in courts.” Id. That assumption, though, effectively
creates a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties when it is combined with Bork’s proposed
rule that “an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty . .
. provides a private right of action.” Id.
238
See supra Part II.D.
239
663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
240
534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
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confiscation of property in Nazi Germany in 1938.241 Plaintiff invoked several treaties in
support of his suit. In evaluating plaintiff’s treaty claims, the court noted that “[i]t is only
when a treaty . . . prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may
be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights.”242 Applying this test, the court held
that none of the treaties invoked by plaintiff “dealt with the expropriation by Germans of
the property of German citizens, and none conferred any private rights with regard to
such property which were enforceable in American courts.”243 This analysis is entirely
consistent with the Marshall model. The court’s rationale is that the treaties at issue were
not “enforceable in American courts” because they did not protect the plaintiff’s property
against confiscation by other Germans. In short, the plaintiff could not obtain a judicial
remedy because the treaties did not protect the individual right he asserted.
The court’s opinion in Dreyfus does contain one statement that could be construed
to support the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies. The court states that a
treaty may “contain provisions which confer rights upon the citizens of one of the
contracting parties which are capable of enforcement as are any other private rights under
the law. In general, however, this is not so.”244 Although the italicized language might
be construed to create a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties, the better
view is that the court is making two distinct claims. The first sentence says that, when
treaties do create individual rights, those rights are judicially enforceable “as are any
other private rights under the law.” This statement is entirely consistent with the
Marshall model. The second sentence does not create a presumption; it merely makes a
factual assertion that treaties generally do not create individual rights. Even if that
assertion is true, which is debatable, it does not support the Bork model, because the
Borkian presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties applies even to treaty
provisions that do create individual rights.245 Dreyfus definitely does not endorse a
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties that create individual rights.246
Judge Bork also cited Canadian Transport Co. v. United States247 in support of
the alleged presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. In Canadian Transport,
plaintiffs sued the United States for money damages, asserting that an 1815 treaty with
Great Britain waived the United States’ sovereign immunity. The D.C. Circuit rejected
this argument and dismissed the claim on sovereign immunity grounds.248 The opinion
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Id. at 26.
Id. at 30
243
Id.
244
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
245
See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
246
In support of the statement quoted above, the court in Dreyfus cited Ian Brownlie, The Place of the
Individual in International Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 435 (1964). In that article, Brownlie says: “[I]t is obvious
that states can agree to confer special rights on individuals . . . . In general, treaties do not create direct
rights and obligations for private individuals, but, if it was the intention of the parties to do this, effect can
be given to the intention.” Id. at 439-40. Thus, the citation to Brownlie makes clear that the Dreyfus court
was not endorsing the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies for violations of treaty provisions that
create individual rights.
247
663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
248
Id. at 1092-93.
242
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includes one clause that appears to support the Bork model: the court stated that “treaty
violations are normally to be redressed outside the courtroom.”249
There are several reasons, however, why this statement cannot reasonably be
construed as an endorsement of the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of
treaties in U.S. courts. First, the 1815 treaty at issue in Canadian Transport has been
enforced by U.S. courts in other contexts, where U.S. sovereign immunity was not
implicated.250 Second, the full sentence in Canadian Transport states: “In the absence of
specific language in the treaty waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, the
treaty must be interpreted in accord with the rule that treaty violations are normally to be
redressed outside the courtroom.”251 Thus, the court’s main point was that plaintiffs who
seek money damages against the United States for treaty violations cannot obtain judicial
relief unless the treaty itself, or some other federal law, waives U.S. sovereign immunity.
This proposition is consistent with the Marshall model because the Marshall model
recognizes sovereign immunity as a valid defense to treaty-based claims in appropriate
circumstances.
Additionally, the cases cited by the court in Canadian Transport actually support
a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties that create individual rights. In
support of its claim that “treaty violations are normally to be redressed outside the
courtroom,” the court in Canadian Transport quoted the following language from The
Head Money Cases.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for
the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual
war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress.252
The court, however, omitted the passage from Head Money that follows immediately
after the language quoted above. There, the Supreme Court said:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits
of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
249

Id. at 1092.
See, e.g., United States v. American Machine & Metals, Inc, 29 C.C.P.A. 137 (U.S. Ct. of
Customs & Patent Appeals 1941) (applying the “most-favored-nation” clause of the 1815 treaty with Great
Britain, together with other treaties, to support a judgment that importation of machines from England was
subject only to a twenty percent duty, instead of the sixty percent duty imposed by the collector at the port).
See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 703-04 (Field, J., dissenting on other grounds) (stating that
article 1 of the 1815 treaty with Great Britain, and other similar treaty provisions “operate by their own
force; that is, they require no legislative action for their enforcement”).
251
663 F.2d at 1092.
252
Canadian Transport, 663 F.2d at 1092 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
250
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capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country. . . . The constitution of the United States places such provisions as
these in the same category as other laws of congress . . . . A treaty, then, is a
law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a
rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.
And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that
court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it
would to a statute.253
Thus, Head Money Cases supports a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of
treaty provisions that “prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen” may be
determined. In other words, treaty provisions that create individual rights are
presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts by private parties.254
In sum, the authorities cited by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren do not endorse the
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts. Judge Bork
made new law in Tel-Oren by inventing the Borkian presumption against judicial
enforcement of treaties. Moreover, as the analysis in Part Two demonstrated, he made
new law that is contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent.
B.

The Private Right of Action Test

In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork stated: “Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has
access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty . . .
provides a private right of action.”255 He cited one Supreme Court decision in support of
this assertion: Head Money Cases. The preceding quotation from Head Money Cases,
though, demonstrates conclusively that the case does not support Judge Bork’s claim.
The Court in Head Money said nothing about private rights of action. To the contrary,
Head Money says that a treaty is judicially enforceable if “its provisions prescribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.”256 In short,
under Head Money, the critical question is whether a treaty provision creates individual
rights. In Tel-Oren, though, Judge Bork recast the issue in terms of remedial rights,
rather than primary rights. Thus, whereas Head Money endorses the Marshall model,
Tel-Oren incorrectly cites Head Money as authority for the Bork model.

253

112 U.S. at 598-99 (emphasis added).
In addition to Head Money Cases, the court in Canadian Transport cited three lower federal court
decisions in support of its assertion that treaty violations are normally redressed outside the courtroom:
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464
(1941); and Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958). None of these cases endorse the Borkian
presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts. For analysis of Dreyfus, see supra notes
241-46 and accompanying text. For analysis of Z & F Assets, see infra notes 260-64 and accompanying
text. Pauling v. McElroy holds that certain provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement
for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are not self-executing. 164 F. Supp. at 393. The opinion does
not contain any language supporting a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.
255
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring).
256
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
254
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In addition to citing Head Money, Judge Bork cited three federal appellate
opinions in support of his proposed private right of action test: Z & F Assets Realization
Corp. v. Hull,257 Diggs v. Richardson,258 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.259 Z & F Assets provides no support for Bork’s private right of action test. In that
case, plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration to invalidate a decision by a claims
commission established pursuant to an international agreement between the United States
and Germany.260 The D.C. Circuit held that the district court “was without jurisdiction to
hear or decide” plaintiff’s claim because the claim “involve[d] a political and not a
judicial question.”261 The D.C. Circuit recognized that “courts, in the exercise of their
judicial functions must interpret and apply” treaties.262 According to Z & F Assets, that is
true only if the treaty at issue “prescribes a rule by which rights of individuals under it
may be determined.”263 If the treaty does not prescribe such a rule, then “the alleged
controversies arising out of treaty relationships . . . are not cases within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution and, consequently, are not subject to judicial
determination.”264 Nowhere in Z & F Assets, however, did the court suggest that a treaty
is not judicially enforceable unless it creates a private right of action.
In Diggs v. Richardson, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the U.S. government “from continuing to deal with the South Africans
concerning the importation of seal furs from Namibia.”265 Plaintiffs based their claim on
a U.N. Security Council resolution urging “member states to have no dealings with South
Africa which impliedly recognize the legality of that country’s occupation of the former
U.N. territory of Namibia.”266 The D.C. Circuit held that the U.N. Security Council
resolution was not self-executing.267 The court elaborated on this holding by stating that
the particular provisions of the resolution invoked by the plaintiffs “do not by their terms
confer rights upon individual citizens.”268 This statement is consistent with the Marshall
model; it suggests that the court denied relief on the grounds that the resolution at issue
did not create or protect individual rights, at least not for the plaintiffs in Diggs.
Diggs contains two other statements, though, that are arguably inconsistent with
the Marshall model. In one, the court stated that the U.N. resolution “does not confer
rights on the citizens of the United States that are enforceable in court in the absence of
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114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
259
595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979).
260
See Z & F Assets, 114 F.2d at 465-67.
261
Id. at 468. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds. See Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v.
Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941).
262
Z & F Assets, 114 F.2d at 470.
263
Id. at 470, n.19 (citing SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
160-61 (2d ed. 1916)). As in Head Money Cases, the court’s analysis in Z & F Assets focuses on primary
rights, not remedial rights. Thus, Z & F Assets is consistent with the Marshall model, not the Bork model.
264
Id. at 470.
265
555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
266
Id.
267
See id. at 850, n.9.
268
Id. at 851.
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implementing legislation.”269 Similarly, the court stated that the specific provisions at
issue “do not confer on individual citizens rights that are judicially enforceable in
American domestic courts.”270 Both statements could be construed to mean that the U.N.
resolution does create individual rights for the Diggs plaintiffs, but those rights are not
enforceable in U.S. courts. Under that interpretation, Diggs would be inconsistent with
the Marshall model. Even if that interpretation is correct, though, Diggs does not say that
there is a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties, nor does it state or imply
that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty creates a private right of action.
Therefore, Diggs does not endorse the Bork model.271
In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork also cited Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.272
in support of the proposition that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty
creates a private right of action. In Mannington Mills, plaintiff alleged that defendant had
violated U.S. antitrust law by securing patents from foreign countries through fraudulent
means.273 The Third Circuit remanded plaintiff’s antitrust claim for additional
factfinding. In addition to raising an antitrust claim, plaintiff also alleged that defendant
violated two multilateral intellectual property treaties by securing foreign patents through
fraud.274 The Third Circuit dismissed this claim on the grounds that the treaties did not
provide a private right of action.275 Thus, Mannington Mills applied the Borkian private
right of action test before Judge Bork endorsed that test in Tel-Oren. (Mannington Mills
was not the first case to do so. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, decided by the Second Circuit in
1976, was the first case in which a U.S. court applied the private right of action test to a
treaty-based claim.276)
There are three reasons why Mannington Mills provides at best limited support for
the Bork model. First, none of the authorities cited by the court in Mannington Mills
endorse the Bork model.277 Second, Mannington Mills does not endorse the Borkian
presumption against judicial remedies for treaty violations.278 Third, in contrast to Judge
269

Id. at 850.
Id. at 851.
271
Even so, Diggs is an important antecedent for the Bork model because the D.C. Circuit in Diggs,
like Judge Bork in Tel-Oren, conflated questions of primary law with questions of remedial law.
272
595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979).
273
Id. at 1290.
274
Id. at 1298. The two treaties at issue were the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Pan-American
Convention of 1910.
275
Id. at 1298-99.
276
Dreyfus, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (“We conclude that the District Court was correct in
holding that no private right of action could be based on the four treaties referred to in plaintiff’s
complaint.”) For the reasons discussed above, the bulk of the analysis in Dreyfus is consistent with the
Marshall model, and Dreyfus does not endorse the Borkian presumption against judicial enforcement of
treaties. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
277
The treaty portion of the court’s opinion in Mannington Mills cites four cases: Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580 (1884); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1976); and Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940). For the
reasons discussed above, none of these cases support the Bork model. See supra notes 241-71 and
accompanying text.
278
The court in Mannington Mills did make the following statement: “Like private rights under law, a
treaty may confer rights capable of enforcement, but this is not the general rule.” 595 F.2d at 1298. This
270
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Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren, the court in Mannington Mills did not endorse any broad
generalization to the effect that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty itself
creates a private right of action. Mannington Mills addressed a specific case in which one
private party sued another private party for money damages. The court in Mannington
Mills did not purport to articulate a rule governing judicial enforcement of treaties by
criminal defendants, or by federal habeas petitioners, for example. Thus, Judge Bork’s
opinion in Tel-Oren goes well beyond the precedent set by Mannington Mills because
Bork’s opinion suggests that criminal defendants and habeas petitioners, among others,
cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty itself, or a federal statute, provides a private right
of action.
C.

Explaining the Rise of the Bork Model

The Bork model of treaty enforcement emerged when lower federal courts
combined two previously separate lines of cases: one related to the doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties, and the other related to implied rights of action. In 1975, in Cort v.
Ash,279 the Supreme Court initiated a series of decisions that effectively created a
presumption against recognizing implied rights of action in cases where individual
plaintiffs sue to enforce rights under federal statutes.280 In Dreyfus v. Von Finck,
Mannington Mills, and Tel-Oren, federal judges transplanted the Supreme Court’s
implied right of action jurisprudence from the statutory context to the treaty context.
That doctrinal innovation produced significant changes in both non-self-execution
doctrine and implied right of action doctrine whose implications have not yet been fully
appreciated.
Prior to the advent of the Bork model in the 1970s and 1980s, non-self-execution
doctrine had not generated a substantial right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties.
Courts applying non-self-execution doctrine generally followed the test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Head Money Cases: that an individual can enforce a treaty in a U.S.
court “whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen
or subject may be determined.”281 Under the Head Money test, there was little or no
right-remedy gap because treaties that protected individual rights were at least
presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts. Granted, there were other versions of non-selfexecution doctrine, but those other versions were generally consistent with the maxim
“where there is a right, there is a remedy.”282 The Bork model replaced the Head Money
statement arguably suggests that there is no presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties, but it
does not endorse a presumption against judicial enforcement. Moreover, immediately after this statement,
the court in Mannington Mills quoted language from Head Money Cases that supports judicial enforcement
of treaty provisions that create individual rights. Thus, Mannington Mills does not endorse the Borkian
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.
279
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
280
See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 781-82 (5th ed. 2003).
281
112 U.S. at 598-99 (1884). See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (CA 1952) (applying
the Head Money test and concluding that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are not selfexecuting).
282
Prior to the emergence of the Bork model, there were three different versions of non-selfexecution doctrine. The first version was the Head Money version, which did not create a substantial right-
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primary rights test with a private right of action test. The Borkian right of action test
creates a huge gap between treaty-based rights and domestic judicial remedies because
most treaties that protect individual rights do not create an express private right of action.
The Bork model also deviates substantially from the implied right of action
doctrine that the Supreme Court has applied in the context of federal statutes. Plaintiffs
can bring suit against state and local government officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enforce federal statutes that do not create a private right of action, as long as the statute
they seek to enforce creates federal rights.283 Plaintiffs can also bring suit against federal
government officers under the Administrative Procedure Act to enjoin federal executive
action that violates a federal statute, even if the statute does not create a private right of
action.284 The Supreme Court has never held that a criminal defendant must show that a
federal statute creates a private right of action in order to invoke that statute as a defense
to a criminal charge. Nor has the Court said that a habeas petitioner must show that a
federal statute creates a private right of action in order to invoke that statute in support of
a petition for habeas corpus relief.
In short, although the Supreme Court has endorsed a presumption against
recognizing implied rights of action under federal statutes, there are a wide variety of
remedial mechanisms that enable individual litigants to enforce federal statutory rights,
even when the statute at issue does not create a private right of action. The Bork model,
in contrast, precludes the use of any remedial mechanism -- by criminal defendants,
habeas petitioners, or civil plaintiffs -- to enforce treaty-based individual rights unless the
treaty itself creates a private right of action, or Congress has authorized private
enforcement of the treaty. Thus, the Bork model imposes far more draconian constraints
on the judicial enforcement of treaty rights than the Supreme Court has imposed on the
judicial enforcement of statutory rights.

remedy gap. (The Head Money version is a variant of the original Foster version. I count both as a single
version of non-self-execution doctrine. See Sloss, supra note 34, at 19-29.) A second version holds that
implementing legislation is constitutionally required to give effect to some treaty provisions. See Sloss,
supra note 34, at 29-35. That version of non-self-execution doctrine does not create a right-remedy gap
because it applies primarily to treaty provisions that obligate the United States to appropriate money, and
such treaty provisions do not create individual rights. A third version of non-self-execution doctrine is
what I have called the “Restatement doctrine,” because the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law, published in 1965, created this version of the doctrine. See Sloss, supra note 34, at 12-18, 70-75.
The Restatement doctrine does create a right-remedy gap, but very few courts applied the doctrine before
1984, when Judge Bork published his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren. The leading example is United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-84 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the Restatement doctrine and holding that
article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is not self-executing).
283
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002).
284
See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004) (where plaintiffs sued to
enforce a statute that did not create a private right of action, Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court,
held that “[t]he APA authorizes suit” for federal statutory violations “[w]here no other statute provides a
private right of action”).
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should reject the Bork model for three reasons. First, the
Bork model is at odds with the Founders’ original understanding of the judiciary’s role in
treaty enforcement. Second, the Bork model is a radical departure from two centuries of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Third, application of the Bork model produces extremely
harmful consequences.
The foregoing analysis of Supreme Court decisions from 1789 to 1838
demonstrates that the Court consistently applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of
judicial remedies for treaty violations. During this period, the Court never applied the
Borkian presumption against judicial remedies, nor did it endorse the Borkian private
right of action test. Supreme Court decisions during the early years of U.S. constitutional
history, by themselves, do not provide conclusive proof of the Founders’ original
understanding. Those decisions, however, are generally consistent with the constitutional
text and eighteenth century historical materials. The constitutional text expressly grants
both state and federal courts the power to enforce treaties.285 Other scholars have
analyzed eighteenth century historical materials to show that the Framers purposefully
designed the constitution to make treaties self-executing.286 This article’s analysis of
nineteenth century case law supplements these other sources. The analysis shows that
Supreme Court decisions from 1789 to 1838 manifest the Founders’ original
understanding that the judiciary has both the power and the duty to enforce treaties on
behalf of individuals whose treaty-based rights are violated, and that courts do not need
express authorization from the political branches to provide remedies for violations of
individual treaty rights.
There is a striking contrast between early nineteenth century Supreme Court
jurisprudence, which conformed to the Marshall model, and late twentieth century
decisions by lower courts that have applied the Bork model. The Bork model emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s when federal appellate judges merged the pre-existing doctrine of
non-self-executing treaties with the then-emerging presumption against finding implied
rights of action under federal statutes. The merger of these two doctrines produced a
revolution in both non-self-execution doctrine and implied right of action doctrine.
Whereas prior non-self-execution doctrine was generally consistent with the maxim
“where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Borkian non-self-execution doctrine created a
huge right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties. Whereas implied right of action
doctrine, as applied in the statutory context, has never imposed a bar to judicial
enforcement of federal statutes on behalf of habeas petitioners, or criminal defendants,

285

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
arising under . . . Treaties.”); U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (specifying that “the Judges in every State shall be
bound” by treaties).
286
See Flaherty, supra note 15; Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1097-1114.
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courts are now applying the Borkian private right of action test to bar judicial
enforcement of treaties on behalf of habeas petitioners and criminal defendants.287
Application of the Bork model generates three different types of harmful
consequences, which relate to federal supremacy, separation of powers, and U.S. foreign
relations. Under the Articles of Confederation, states were routinely violating U.S. treaty
obligations and the federal government was powerless to halt those violations.288 The
Framers’ solution to this problem, embodied in the Supremacy Clause, was to give
treaties the status of federal law, and to make treaties directly binding on judges in state
courts.289 In recent years, state and local governments have routinely violated U.S.
obligations under Article 36(1) of the VCCR,290 just as state governments violated U.S.
treaty obligations before adoption of the Constitution. If courts applied the Marshall
model, most law enforcement officers would probably stop violating the VCCR to avoid
the likely consequences of continued violations: reversal of convictions or exclusion of
evidence.291 The treaty violations persist, however, because courts have applied the Bork
model and refused to enforce the treaty. Thus, continued application of the Bork model
perpetuates the very problem of treaty violations by state officers that the Framers
thought they solved by including treaties in the text of the Supremacy Clause.
The second harmful consequence relates to separation of powers. The Geneva
Conventions are supreme federal law under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause.
Accordingly, the President has a duty under the Take Care Clause292 to ensure that the
The President’s decision to utilize military
treaties are faithfully executed.293
commissions to conduct trials of several Guantanamo detainees is a violation of the
Geneva Conventions,294 and therefore a violation of the President’s duty to take care that
287

See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Bork model and
denying relief to habeas petitioner who alleged violation of his rights under the POW Convention); State v.
Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-78 (Or. 2005) (applying Bork model and denying relief to criminal
defendant who alleged violation of his rights under the VCCR).
288
See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1101-04.
289
See id. at 1104-10. See also Flaherty, supra note 15, at 2120-26.
290
Article 36(1) of the VCCR grants foreign nationals arrested in the United States a right to consult
with consular officers from their home countries. See VCCR, supra note 7, art. 36, ¶ 1(a). The United
States has a treaty obligation to “inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under” Article 36.
Id., ¶ 1(b). State and local officers frequently violate the notification requirement under article 36(1)(b).
291
In many of the VCCR cases, government officers can make a plausible argument that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the violation of his or her treaty rights. The Marshall model does not
require a remedy in cases where the individual was not prejudiced. In other cases, though, individual
defendants probably were prejudiced by the denial of their rights under the VCCR. The Marshall model
does not mandate a particular remedy in cases where an individual is prejudiced by a violation of his treaty
rights, but it does require an effective remedy. The two types of remedies most frequently requested by
defendants in VCCR cases are exclusion of evidence (if the treaty violation is discovered before trial) and
reversal of a conviction (if the treaty violation is discovered after trial).
292
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (obligating the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed”).
293
See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 Cornell
L. Rev. 97, 154-64 (2004).
294
This statement assumes that the detainees are protected by the Geneva Conventions, either as
prisoners of war or under Common Article 3. For a defense of this assumption, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
No. 05-184, Brief of Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks and Anne-Marie Slaughter as Amicus Curiae
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the treaties are faithfully executed. The judiciary has a constitutional responsibility to
restrain federal executive action that violates federal law, including treaties. In Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, the D.C. Circuit abdicated its responsibility to restrain illegal executive
action by refusing to halt the use of military commissions that violate the Geneva
Conventions.295 The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to enforce the Geneva Conventions is directly
attributable to its application of the Bork model.296 When federal courts turn a blind eye
to executive action that violates federal law, they distort the constitutional balance of
power by ceding too much power to the President, and diminishing the relative powers of
the legislative and judicial branches. Thus, Hamdan shows how application of the Bork
model induces courts to abdicate their responsibility to restrain illegal executive action,
thereby distorting the constitutional balance of power among the branches.
Finally, judicial application of the Bork model harms the United States’
international reputation. Ongoing U.S. violations of both the VCCR and the POW
Convention contribute to a growing perception around the world that the United States is
hostile to international law. More specifically, other countries accuse the U.S. of trying
to develop an international system in which other states are constrained by international
law, but the U.S. is free to pursue its national interests, unfettered by the requirements of
international law. Proponents of the Bork model may object that it is inappropriate for
courts to concern themselves with international perceptions of U.S. behavior. That
objection, though, merely serves to highlight the intellectual gulf between the Marshall
Court and modern Borkians. According to a leading historical account, the Marshall
Court’s decisions manifested “deep concern that the United States be known for its
adherence to international law and its respect for treaty obligations. . . . In construing
treaties of the Untied States, the Court exercised great liberality in broadening the rights
of the signatory powers and those claiming under them.”297 Modern courts would do
well to follow the Marshallian example.

Supporting Reversal, available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/briefs. If a particular detainee is a
prisoner of war, then trial by military commission would violate Article 102 of the POW Convention. See
POW Convention, supra note 5, art. 102. If the detainee is protected by Common Article 3, trial by
military commission is also prohibited because that article requires that he be tried only by a “regularly
constituted court.” See POW Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 1(d).
295
See Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C. Circuit held that “Congress authorized the
military commission that will try Hamdan.” Id. at 37-38. If this conclusion is correct, then the court would
be justified in denying Hamdan’s habeas petition because Congress has the constitutional power to
authorize actions that violate U.S. treaty obligations. The claim that Congress authorized the use of
military commissions, however, is not persuasive. See Amicus Brief of 280 Law Professors (contending
that Congress has not approved the use of military commissions), available at
http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/briefs. Assuming that Congress has not authorized the use of military
commissions that violate the Geneva Conventions, the President has a constitutional duty to comply with
the treaties, and the courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that the President executes his duty.
296
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that “this country has
traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they do not create judicially enforceable
individual rights”); id. at 40 (holding that the habeas statute merely granted the district court jurisdiction
over Hamdan’s habeas petition, but it “did not render the Geneva Convention judicially enforceable”).
297
Haskins & Johnson, supra note 146, at 557.
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